


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Africa (Sub-Sahara)

Africa

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Transport net underdeveloped

[Text] POPULATION is concentrated along the main rail and road trunk route down Botswana's eastern border. Access to other areas is often possible only by four wheel drive vehicles on rough tracks.

The gazetted road network covers about 8 000 km of which only about 1 762 km is tarred.

A major arterial transport line, the north to south road from Ramokgwebana to Ramatlaba, and the road link from Francistown to Kazangula have been upgraded. The ferry link to Zambia at Kazangula is of vital strategic importance as it gives access to Botswana's northern neighbours and the Tazara rail link to Dar es Salaam, thus lessening dependence on South Africa's ports when necessary.

The railway system runs some 640 kms from Bakaranga near the border with Zimbabwe at Plumtree to Ramatlaba on the southern border with South Africa. Two rail spurs carry coal from Morupule to Selibe-Phikwe and Gaborone and copper nickel matte from Selibe for export.

The rail network is operated by the National Railways of Zimbabwe but was to be handed over to Botswana authorities in January this year.

The hand-over was postponed for administrative reasons and is being replanned as the training of local personnel continues.

Plans are in hand for the acquisition of rolling stock and locomotives to augment the limited equipment Botswana already owns - 12 diesel electric main line locomotives which are used to help NRZ avoid transport congestion, 47 coal wagons, two track maintenance rigs, and 13 water tank wagons.

The rail line in the south has been re-laid with electronic siding equipment installed at the South African border.

Meanwhile, studies are being carried out into the feasibility of opening up a new transport link to the Namibian coast.

The first studies have focussed on a link to the transport terminus of Gobabis in Namibia to cater for beef producing areas and future coal mining developments.

Another idea is to build a rail link to South Africa's major coal port at Richards Bay.

Employment problems looming

WITH its growing prosperity and its sustained economic growth rate—a remarkable 10 percent average over the last decade—the number of migrant workers leaving Botswana for South Africa is slowly declining.

The lure of the South African mines traditionally attracted thousands of young Batswana every year because of the lack of work opportunity at home.

This inevitably had repercussions on family life, particularly in rural areas, and left its impact on farm production, land management and social structures.

The most recent figures available (1983) show that in that year nearly 18 000 Botswana citizens were working in South Africa. The migrant workers remitted approximately Pula 7,6 million while earnings from deferred pay amounted to more than P16,3 million (P11 is roughly equivalent to Z\$1).

Now, however, agencies or organisations recruiting labour in Botswana must be registered and obtain special licences laying down conditions and terms of employment which include requirements on the repatriation of the workers.

The number of recruiting organisations has declined sharply during the last five years and the Botswana Department of Labour has an official representative based at Roodepoort in South Africa to monitor the government's regulations.

To develop its own mineral potential the Department of Labour has also established procedures under which registers of job seekers are kept and those with mining experience in South Africa are selected for mineral development projects within Botswana.

In the labour sector, official Botswana government figures indicate that formal employment within the country has grown by an average of 8 percent a year since 1966.

South African mining employment now accounts for only 19 percent of all formal employment compared to 40 percent in 1956.

Fewer people are solely dependent on rural traditional agriculture and the proportion of the population who do depend on subsistence agriculture has declined to under one third.

Until 1981 employment in the formal sector grew by about 10 percent per year with total employment rising from only 41 300 in 1972 to 97 400 in 1981.

According to Botswana's Ministry of Finance and Development Planning the formal sector absorbs only about 20 percent of the labour force.

"This means that the number of Batswana looking for jobs far exceeds the number of job opportunities the economy is capable of creating at any one time.

"Total formal sector employment is forecast to increase from 121 300 in 1985/86 to 159 500 in 1990/91, an increase of about 7 600 new jobs a year.

"This," says the ministry, "is a very disconcerting position when it is viewed against the projected increase in the labour force of about 20 000 a year. The picture emerging from this forecast is very bleak indeed and it emphasises the need for the government to intensify efforts in promoting labour intensive policies and other policies and programmes aimed at facilitating productive employment in the rural and informal sectors."

The Botswana government has recognised the lack of skilled and specialist manpower and while operating skills training programmes allows a liberal number of expatriates to fill skilled posts. Less than 2 percent of expatriates in the country are employed in an unskilled capacity.

In 1974 there were about 3 000 expatriates in Botswana and they represented about 7 percent of total employment. By 1980 5.6 percent (4 600 people) of total employment was made up of expatriates. Non-citizens are mainly to be found in local and central government, the teaching service, finance and business and in agriculture and specialist mining and engineering posts.

Today there are 18 registered trade unions in Botswana. Trade union activities are co-ordinated by the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (formed in 1977). Overall, the country's labour relations record has been affected by a few sporadic incidents of unrest and isolated strikes.

Economic diversification planned

ALL the economic indicators point to continued growth in the Botswana economy.

Comparing 1984 and 1985 returns, the Botswana Development Corporation, the country's main agency for commercial and industrial development, suggests that the trends are unlikely to change dramatically in 1986/87.

BDC chairman B. Gaolathe has pointed out that GDP rose by 17 percent in 1984/85 but taking into account increased prices the purchasing power in the economy rose by 9 percent.

Minerals continue to be the backbone of the economy, with an output of 12.6 million carats of diamonds in 1985 providing 93 percent of the government's revenue—a higher revenue than anticipated because of depreciation of the Pula against the US dollar and the weakness of the South African rand.

During 1986/87 diamonds are only expected to contribute 57 percent of government revenues.

Both government and the private sector have pointed out that more diversification is needed in the Botswana economy to avoid the traps experienced by Zambia in its over-dependence on copper.

"The minerals sector should not continue to be relied upon as the major provider of growth in the economy," says Gaolathe. "Production levels on existing projects are on a plateau and there are no new major projects on the immediate horizon.

"This emphasises the need to direct the wealth generated by this sector into other areas that will diversify the economy and lay the foundation of continued, sustained development in the future."

After years of rapid production increases, production has levelled off at the three diamond mines owned by Debswana, the government-De Beers 50-50 partnership.

The budget of Finance Minister Peter Mmusi in 1986/87 stressed caution despite a record P1645 million in foreign exchange reserves representing 14 months of import cover.

Diamond revenues in 1986/87 are expected to be in the region of P686 million allowing for a budget surplus of P292 million on total expenditure of P904.

(The Botswana government gets about 78 percent of Debswana's diamond profits).

Minister Mmusi's emphasis, supported by his cabinet colleagues, is on "foresight and discipline" in the economy and he has been widely quoted as saying Botswana must "resist the temptation to spend its reserves."

But diversification is not without its difficulties. Diamonds account for 70 percent of exports and beef, once the mainstay of exports account for about 11 percent.

Constraints to diversification are the small size of the local market for manufactured goods and the competition in manufacturing from South Africa and the black bantustans which also offer attractive investment incentives.

There are shortages of skilled labour, housing and land are expensive, infrastructure is costly and services are restricted in less populated areas.

There have been no cases of nationalisation of private enterprises.

On the mining front, official policy is to move away from South African mining technology and expertise as much as possible.

According to Africa Review, an American concern, Amax, has a 25,5 percent stake in the other important mining undertaking, copper-nickel production at Selebi-Pikwe, which employs 4 500. But Anglo American (linked to De Beers) is again a major partner in the operating company, BCL, also with a 25,5 percent share.

Selebi-Pikwe has been dogged with heavy losses, and when accumulated debt reached \$587m in 1985 restructuring was necessary, pushing 1986-87 debt repayments forward by a decade.

BCL went on to do better. In 1985 mineral exports rose to a record 41 000 tonnes and profits were US\$27m. But bad prospects for copper and nickel prices still leave a question mark over the operation. Ores are expected to last into the next century, but the government has already launched a \$12m project to create alternative jobs for the town, with a \$7,6m World Bank loan.

A coal mine developed by Anglo American at Morupule supplies the Selebi-Pikwe smelter and town, and a 90MW station opened at Morupule, at a final cost of P276m, is linked to a new eastern grid for Gaborone and two of the diamond mines.

Plans to develop the huge Kgwase coal deposits have been dropped in the current National development plan, the project would be financially feasible only if world prices were to rise substantially.

Another project is the P300m exploitation of the Sua Pan soda ash deposits. Its technical feasibility has been established, and it is thought capable of producing 300 000 tonnes of soda ash a year, as well as salt and potash, enough to supply the whole of southern Africa.

There were problems raising the finance to develop the soda ash project and access to the South African market was considered essential for the project's viability.

The Botswana Development Corporation says that for an open economy such as Botswana's exchange rate policy is of great importance for preserving both price stability and competitiveness.

In 1985 the Pula was devalued by 15 percent and then slightly revalued.

Inflation has been kept within reasonable limits. Prices in 1985 rose by about 10 percent, a level which has been maintained despite strong external pressures and inflation in South Africa rising to nearly double Botswana's rate.

RSA competition holds back industrialization

BOTSWANA'S membership of the Southern African Customs Union with South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland has hampered its industrial development.

The union provides for the free and virtually unimpeded exchange of goods between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.

The abundance of South African exports has been a disincentive to industrial investment. Industrial progress has also been held back by the small size of the domestic market, the shortage of skilled manpower drawn from its comparatively small population and the limited availability of water and electricity.

Serviced urban land is expensive and when water and electricity is available it comes at a price.

Botswana's official policy is to create job opportunities for the growing labour force through the encouragement of labour intensive, import substitution and export orientated industries.

The pull of South Africa continues to dominate the small manufacturing sector. South African firms dominate brewing, light industry and the wholesale and retail trades. Investment incentives and the easy access to imported raw materials have also encouraged Zimbabwean firms to operate in Botswana and, in some cases, to move operations entirely to Botswana and then export their products to Zimbabwe.

Bulawayo has been affected by this trend. Canning and food processing industries have grown, using fords, produce, packaging materials and printing services from both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

According to an economic survey by Barclays Bank, Botswana's own raw materials offer a number of opportunities for industrialisation.

The cattle industry provides opportunities for expanding the leather industry and especially in the manufacture of shoes and boots.

Game skins, curios and trophies from the country's wildlife could also be exploited further.

Good long term possibilities for industrial development include the production of ceramics and facing bricks from local clays, the processing of fish and fish meal from the Okavango area and the production of paper products from the country's timber resources.

"With the development of the mining sector in Botswana it is possible that many related industries could be successfully established," says the survey.

Examples of import substitution industries include processed foods, soft drinks and beer, clothing and textiles and building materials.

Access to the markets of SADCC and beyond—into the PTA, of which Botswana is an observer and not a member because it belongs to the Rand Customs

Union—could provide viable, indeed highly lucrative, opportunities for the manufacture of items such as candles, pharmaceuticals, soap, chemical and toilet products, plastic goods and clothing.

Botswana offers many advantages to the industrialist and potential investor. It has an ample supply of unskilled labour. Under Lome it has preferential trading access to the countries of the European Community.

Despite its relationship with South Africa and suspicion directed against South African firms "laundering" transactions through Botswana, the country retains a political respectability as an independent black African state and, as such, has access to the rest of Africa and particularly its other eight partners in SADCC.

Although still in its infancy, industry has grown considerably during the last seven years.

In 1980 there were 13 locally owned licensed manufacturing firms employing more than ten people, while in mid-1984 there were 32 companies. Joint ventures with foreign companies totalled 26 in 1980 and 55 in 1984, while foreign-owned firms in this category have grown in number from 45 to 122 over the same period.

Manufacturing licence applications average one or two per week. All of the statistics quoted are in respect of manufacturing businesses which are already operating.

There are also 67 manufacturing units which have been granted manufacturing licences but are not yet actually operational. The government has concentrated its resources on meeting the country's basic infrastructural needs.

Demarcation of additional urban industrial land is proceeding and a programme for creating fully serviced industrial areas in the main rural villages is being financed by the European Development Fund.

Most industries are located in the four major towns of Francistown, Gaborone, Lobatse and Selebi-Phikwe. Francistown has two light industrial estates and a third is under consideration.

A few plots are available at the industrial site and Broadhurst in Gaborone. An advanced industrial area, some 65 hectares in extent, is planned for Gaborone West. Primary infrastructure has been installed. Rail siding facilities are to be available and a goods marshalling yard designed to handle containers will be incorporated in the area.

There are a small number of industries at Lobatse, where it is intended to establish an industrial estate, while Selebi-Hhikwe has one area devoted to industry.

Development blueprint

BOTSWANA'S national development plan stresses job creation and rural development as its two main thrusts.

Unemployment is a growing problem with about 21 000 school leavers joining the job market each year with under 8 000 jobs being created each year in the formal sectors of the economy. (Zimbabwe is producing about 90 000 school leavers and creating about 7 000 new jobs).

In Botswana's 1986/87 budget education received 12 percent of the total expenditure allocated and a six year programme to provide another 311 000 primary and secondary school places, mainly in remote areas, is being funded by the World Bank.

The country's mineral wealth has been steadily channelled into promoting economic growth even at a time of depressed world commodity prices when austerity was called for.

The success of the government's tough but cautious approach to development has won Botswana considerable international respect.

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POLITICAL

Efforts to Create Climate For Negotiations Discussed in Various Circles

34000127 Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS in
English Oct/Nov 87 pp 17-22

[First paragraph WORK IN PROGRESS Introduction.
Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Negotiations over South Africa's political future are not currently on the cards. But, according to MARK SWILLING, ways of creating a 'climate of negotiation' are being discussed in influential circles.

Dramatic new departures in white politics, pioneered by the Five Freedoms Forum and the newly-formed National Democratic Movement, point to political realignments concerned with negotiations over South Africa's future.

Recent statements by government and black political leaders have renewed the debate over negotiations. Cynics argue this is all for the sake of an international audience. They depict South Africa as spiralling into a black hole of aimless violence, where the militarised state can only save itself by smashing black opposition movements. These are presented as weak, unrealistic, increasingly radical organisations led by utopian leaders deluded by visions of armed seizure of power.

This view ignores the complexities of changing power relations within the state, capital and liberation movements. The central focus of these conflicts is how 'a climate of negotiation' can be created.

Recently the deputy minister of constitutional development and planning, Stoffel van der Merwe, suggested there was a need for talks between the United Democratic Front and government representatives. Others in the state have put out feelers to the banned African National Congress. These developments confirm what senior officials in reformist circles have said off the record since the all-white May election.

These officials believe the state has painted itself into a corner. On the one hand government realises the severity of its crisis of legitimacy. The only solution to this involves a new constitutional dispensation, paving the way for full parliamentary representation in the 'united South Africa'. This was the central reformist idea in the National Party's election manifesto.

On the other hand, military strategists around PW Botha have taken a hard line on the extra-parliamentary opposition. They activated the national security management system (NSMS) with its 11 regional joint management centres (JMCs). This security apparatus also includes 60 sub-JMCs at sub-regional level and 350 mini-JMCs at local level.

This complex system of militarised rule effectively eliminates all channels for negotiation with opposition leaders and organisations enjoying popular legitimacy. A JMC strategy report leaked to the press in 1986 instructed local officials not to 'negotiate with revolutionary organisations'.

The national council has failed to attract even moderate support. The special cabinet committee on black affairs (appointed around January 1984) has been unable to produce workable solutions. Both these failures underline the dilemma which faces the state.

State reformers resurface

Recent government attempts to talk to the UDF, ANC, National Education Crisis Committee and several local civics, are the result of the re-emergence of a reformist position within the state which was effectively marginalised in April-May 1986. Until then, political initiative within the state was in the hands of an influential group of advanced reformers. They were found mainly in Heunis' department of constitutional development and planning, but also in manpower, finance, foreign affairs and the National Party itself.

This group pioneered key policy shifts: the inclusion of Africans in the regional services councils (RSCs); scrapping of pass laws; dropping of mixed marriages and political interference laws; and discussion of 'regional-federal' options, which are clearly present in proposals that the national council should be elected by constituencies defined in terms of the nine regional development boundaries.

The Heunis empire emerged after the 1985 cabinet reshuffle that destroyed Piet Koornhof's department of co-operation and development. The department of constitutional development gained control of almost every aspect of black life. While constitutional planners pioneered domestic reforms, foreign affairs was exploring the possibility of national negotiations during the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) mission.

But the reformists lost the initiative to the militarists in early 1986. In April a rift appeared between the statements of PW Botha and Magnus Malan, and the [word indistinct] of Heunis and his group Botha and Malan spoke about 'city-states' and 'independence' for bantustans, and defended the detention/imprisonment of political leaders. The reformists were proceeding with the inclusion of black local authorities into RSCs, backpeddling on independence and undoing [word indistinct] control. They supported negotiations between senior government officials and UDF leaders in places like Port Elizabeth, Oudtshoorn, Worcester, Cradock, Uitenhage, Port Alfred and netown).

Some sources say this rift was the result of a clash in the cabinet after PW Botha refused to accept criticisms from officials in Heunis' department.

The final break between reformers and militarists came after the state security council decided to bomb frontline state capitals to destroy the EPG initiative.

It is significant that PW Botha currently says the ANC's 'renunciation' of violence is a pre-condition for talks. Before the EPG mission collapsed government conceded that 'suspension' of violence would be sufficient. The EPG indicated the ANC would accept this. PW Botha and the generals suddenly realised the chips were down - they had to make a choice about negotiations.

The choice they made activated a sophisticated counter-revolutionary strategy. Its objectives were clearly expressed in a May 1986 speech by current law and order minister, Adriaan Vlok: 'bomb the enemy in its bases'; 're-establish law and order', ie mass detentions; 'bring government down to the people', ie RSCs; 'redistribute resources from white areas to upgrade black areas'.

A national state of emergency followed, and the national security management system was activated at local and regional level. The security police, and sections of the military, promised the state security council that township protest, 'alternative structures' and ANC support could be eliminated by applying enough force in a relatively short space of time. This was the basis for sometime security policeman Craig Williamson's remark in a June 1986 BBC interview that the South African 'rugby stadium' option could work in South Africa.

This strategy aimed to restore the state's 'position of strength' and refute Zwelakhe Sisulu's March 1986 claim at an NECC conference that 'the state had lost the initiative to the people'.

The militarists in the NSMS argued that negotiations could only be considered if the state regained this 'position of strength'. Still reeling from the international and domestic consequences of the Rubicon I and Rubicon II fiascos, it was not surprising that Botha found the alternative of armed procrastination attractive.

The rise of the 'securocrats'

The decision to abort the EPG mission and regain the initiative was taken largely by an inner power elite dominated by what Professor Willie Breytenbach calls the 'securocrats' - powerful security personnel who co-ordinate key state apparatuses. As Frederick van Zyl Slabbert said, they govern in an 'extra-parliamentary' manner and use parliament to both legalise and legitimise their actions.

The rise of the securocrats has led some observers to refer to current state strategy as the 'Brazilian Opposition'. Some key securocrats believe Brazil's militarily-managed 20-year reform programme (1964-1986) is a model of how to restructure political institutions without capitulating or losing power.

This 'option' is not purely coercive. In March 1986, Mike Hough of Pretoria University's Strategic Studies Institute, described state strategy far more clearly than his fellow political scientist, Stoffel van der Merwe, has been able to do. 'Reform and unrest are not totally contradictory situations', said Hough. 'Reform creates rising expectations and counteraction by those who do not want reform, but revolution. Hopefully the longer-term effects of credible and meaningful reform will lessen revolutionary and unrest potential, as will economic recovery. In the interim, the maintenance of law and order, within limits, is crucial. Reform alone will not cause the ANC to disappear'.

This was the logic Willie Breytenbach referred to when, with deep scepticism, he said that 'where once there could be no security without reform, now there can be no reform without security'.

Militarist strength and marginalisation of the reformers depended on the success of the repressive component of the strategy. But legal non-violent extra-parliamentary opposition survived and the state of emergency was re-declared. This indicated that repression had not been as effective and decisive as the securocrats had hoped. It critically weakened their overall strategic objective and opened the way for disagreements, divisions and even contradictions within the state and between state and capital.

Informed sources in both the private and public sectors claim that General Johan Coetzee was ousted as commissioner of police precisely because he pointed out the limitations of emergency rule. Coetzee, also a political scientist with a post-graduate degree on South African Trotskyism, is a more sophisticated political theorist than younger idealists like van der Merwe, Hough and the eager securocrats in the secretariat of the state security council. There is evidence to suggest Coetzee argued that the mounting costs of repression were unjustified given the low-level returns.

A key reason limiting the Brazilian option in South Africa is its failure to attract the support of monopoly capital. In Brazil the ideology of militarised reform was accepted by the national bourgeoisie, international capital and some co-opted elites in the non-capitalist classes.

In South Africa, coercive co-option has produced some black petty-bourgeois elites who believe it is in their interest to 'participate' in parliament and local authorities. But monopoly and international capital remain deeply sceptical over whether reform from above will succeed.

This is why business has generally not supported the 1986-87 state of emergency after its previous support for the 1985-86 emergency. But this could change. Capital's involvement in RSCs, housing construction and economic recovery could mean it adopts a 'supportive ideology' by default.

The private sector has shown support for the 'positive development work' of JMCs in places like Alexandra and Mamelodi, and support for the state's 'success' in bringing an end to 'township violence'. These attitudes may point to the militarisation of capitalist ideology. This is the context in which NSMS officials are holding country-wide seminars with senior management personnel at present.

Models or open-ended negotiation?

It is too early to predict the 'failure' of the Brazilian option. But given the limited success of repression, it appears reformers in the state have begun to re-assert their position.

In the pre-EPG period the debate amongst reformers was over different constitutional 'models' (federalism versus confederalism versus federal/confederalism versus confederalism). The debate is now between 'models' and negotiation 'processes' which would be more open-ended. Three examples of this tendency can be mentioned.

Firstly, the need for negotiation processes is a key concern in the newly formed special committee of the council for the co-ordination of local government affairs. This committee's brief was shaped by Heunis' recent speech to the Urban Council Association of South Africa (UCASA) conference where he called for the formulation of a 'uniform local government law'. He probably meant a single law implemented through different locally-determined systems rather than a uniform system imposed on all areas irrespective of local power relations. This committee met for the first time in August.

Secondly, the press failed to note the significance of Heunis' skilful stalling tactics which placed the National Council Bill in a select committee until next year, despite PW Botha's insistence that the bill should go through parliament this session.

Heunis's scheme was an attempt to head-off the disastrous political consequences of major extra-parliamentary protests against the national council, and prepare the way for more open-ended negotiation processes.

Thirdly, in a number of areas in Natal, Eastern Cape and Transvaal, government officials have again initiated talks with local civics around urban upgrading programmes.

The reformers will not necessarily regain the initiative within the state. Conflict between them and the securocrats remains intense with each pushing for different 'solutions' to the crisis. This was most evident in different campaign speeches during the white election.

For the militarist camp (Botha, Malan, Vlok), the priorities of reform were: first to re-establish law and order; second, economic recovery; third, socio-economic upgrading of black townships ('Operation Oilspot'); and fourth, constitutional solutions to the problem of political rights.

For the reformers (especially Viljoen, de Beer and Heunis), law and order can only be re-established if the problem of political rights is resolved first.

These 'different solutions depend on different diagnoses of the problem. The militarists assume 'communist agitators' and 'socio-economic' grievances underlie black unrest, while the reformers accept that lack of political rights is an important cause of black resistance.

The survival of internal opposition

The liberation movement's capacity to strike direct blows against the state has been severely weakened since the national state of emergency. But it has nevertheless strengthened and consolidated its political and organisational structures. Internally this was reflected in:

- * the formation of the South African Youth Congress despite the difficulties of underground organisation;
- * the defence of COSATU despite security force attempts to provoke it into premature counter-reaction after the cosatu house bombing;
- * the holding of several key trade union congresses that consolidated industrial union power and committed the unions to a strong political stand;
- * the UDF's ability to hold a secret national conference to review and consolidate its position;
- * the 5 and 6 May national stayaway protest against the white elections. This was arguably the largest and most successful two-day stayaway in South Africa's history, where the Rand and some Natal townships equalled the Eastern Cape's full-scale support;
- * the persistence, spread and organisational consolidation of rent boycotts in all the key Transvaal and Eastern Cape centres;
- * massive escalation in strike levels throughout 1986 and into 1987. The SATS strike was a clear example of how industrial conflict has been irreversibly politicised;

* the reigning-in of militant youth squads, which were becoming increasingly uncontrollable during the first months of 1986;

* the ending of the three-year schools boycott as a result of NECC initiatives.

Local-level grassroots organisations were badly hit by repression. In many small Eastern Cape and Transvaal townships, 'alternative structures' have been smashed. Places once renowned for their street committees and people's courts - like Port Alfred, Alexandra and Mamelodi - suffered waves of detentions, vigilante action and, more recently, treason and sedition trials.

From the seizure of power to a negotiated settlement

International rejection of the South African state's internal policies greatly strengthened the ANC's position with Western governments. The ANC is more than ever before entrenched as 'the factor' in the various international foreign policy formulae. This has led the ANC to clarify and refine its commitment to a negotiated settlement rather than an 'armed seizure of power'.

Although the ANC's position in the West is not as solid as it would like, there are indications that the Soviet Union's new foreign policy will strengthen this.

In line with the 27th Party Congress resolution to stabilise world security by 'defusing conflict situations', the Soviets are keen to demilitarise Southern Africa, pressurise the West into more comprehensive sanctions coupled to firmer recognition of the ANC, and find a negotiated settlement to the 'national liberation' (as opposed to the socialist) struggle. The Soviets see defusing conflict with the West as the only way they can re-direct scarce resources into much-needed economic development programmes and gain access to Western technology.

There is a debate within the USSR Academy of Sciences - a key foreign policy think-tank - over Gleb Starushenko's proposal that whites should be offered 'group rights' guarantees to hasten the negotiation process. But all agree that military escalation is not the solution. International diplomatic alliances, therefore, become crucial.

A more important reason for the ANC shift in emphasis from 'armed seizure of power' to 'negotiated settlement' is the fragile economic and military position of the frontline states.

There is evidence that these states are not prepared to host an ANC movement engaged in a full-scale battle with the economic and military might of the South African state. South African destabilisation strategies have already reduced most of Mozambique and Angola to socio-political wastelands, Zambia has economic

problems with parts of the countryside not much better than Mozambique, and Zimbabwe is very reluctant to sacrifice its economic surplus for the sake of the South African struggle.

The internal stability and survival of present frontline governments may depend on a speedy negotiated settlement of the South African problem. This is something the ANC cannot ignore.

Towards a climate of negotiation

South African trade union and political organisations have not only survived one of the most brutal periods of repression in recent times, but have been able to strengthen political and organisational structures. Externally, the ANC has consolidated and clarified its position on a negotiated settlement. The strength of the internal movements will greatly assist the ANC's negotiating hand.

But both the internal organisations and the ANC still maintain that a 'climate for negotiation' can only be created if all political prisoners and detainees are released, exiles allowed to return to South Africa unconditionally, repressive laws dismantled, organisations unbanned and the right to free association guaranteed.

It remains to be seen how internal and external opposition movement positions will respond to changes in state strategy if reformers regain the initiative. Equally important will be the political strategy and ideological direction of monopoly capital.

The worst scenario involves the continued dominance of securocrats backed by an increasingly submissive and politically impotent capitalist class. The most hopeful includes the demise of the securocrats and the consolidation of the reformers backed by big capital. But there is no chance of this happening before PW Botha's retirement.

The most likely future involves the state lurching from one badly conceived 'option' to another, failing to break the stalemate or unify the capitalist class around a purposive political programme. In the meantime, the repressive screws on black opposition will remain, if not tighten.

The politics of negotiation will become the focus of political conflict. Whether this will involve an attempt at top-down co-option via the national council, or the beginnings of a properly negotiated settlement with popularly recognised opposition leaders, remains to be seen.

How this 'climate of negotiation' is created will affect the way the current stalemate is resolved. The government is unlikely to make any momentous decisions in this regard. But there may be hope in the recent Five Freedoms Forum proposal for the launch of a grassroots

movement of white democrats united around the concern for national survival and the demand for a negotiated settlement. This initiative, coupled with the impact the National Democratic Movement is bound to have on Afrikanerdom, might well force white politics across its Rubicon. The pressure of black resistance together with debilitating divisions in the white power bloc may steadily isolate the securocrats.

/12913

**Rising Corruption, Maladministration
Deteriorating Homelands Image**

34000098 Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English
16 Oct 87 pp 30-31

[Text] What on earth is to be done about the homelands? If you won one in a raffle, would you keep it? The turbulent exit of the Matanzimas in Transkei—carried off by floods of bad publicity involving alleged corruption—is only one indicator that all is not well in the black statelets.

Of course, they are not recognised in international law; of course they are based on the inequitable territorial allocations of the Land Acts; and of course they are blatantly political in that they serve as the geographical basis of the denationalisation policy.

But they exist—and the longer they do so, the more likely they are to take on the character of former colonies, with all this implies of rule by elite and economic dependency on metropolitan (in our case, Pretoria) largesse. The price seems rather too high.

They were never exactly regarded as model nations. Now the four independent TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), and, with some notable exceptions, the six self-governing homelands, appear to be entering a period of moral and financial laxity—the consequences of which remain unquantifiable.

The level of corruption exposed by the commission of inquiry into Transkei's Department of Public Works and Energy has shocked even those inured to the worst excesses of homeland administrations.

The prospect of millions of rands being skimmed off the top of contracts never put out to tender; of property wheeling and dealing on behalf of favoured sons or those close to the seat of power; and of Cabinet ministers being marched out of office by force has, rightly, left many South Africans aghast.

And though it has not happened yet, the prospect exists of a coup in one of the homelands which could trigger regional instability—with SA exercising its own version of the Brezhnev doctrine and intervening in the affairs of a hostile state within its "hemisphere."

The dubious legal status of the independent homelands has lately thrown up an example of how SA's relations with Western nations can be bedeviled. It was singularly embarrassing to have SA embroiled in a diplomatic tug-of-war (in the Albertini affair) because France and the rest of the international community refuses to recognise SA's creation, Ciskei, as a sovereign state.

Moreover, it is untenable that the army of our homeland (Transkei) should invade—on whatever scale—that of another (Ciskei) and cause loss of life and the destruction of property. All in the name of a personal vendetta—its roots in tribalism—between the two administrations. That incident earlier this year was happily resolved only after the intervention of top officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the signing of a non-aggression pact between the two adversaries similar to that of the Nkomati Accord.

Goings-on of this kind are taking an exacting toll on the image of SA's homelands abroad (such as it is) and, by extension, that of SA too (such as it is). It begs the question: what further traumas can SA expect from its truculent offspring in the months and years ahead?

To her credit, the new incumbent in Transkei, Stella Sigcau, pledged herself to a clean administration in her first public statement. That, in the light of the legacy of successive Transkei administrations, might be an impossible dream. Nevertheless, it is a laudable objective and one which needs support—especially since South African taxpayers' funds are at risk to misbehavior.

It is perhaps simplistic to see the type of maladministration in evidence in the homelands as a purely African phenomenon. That is not to say that they do not take their cue, in part, from countries to the north of the Limpopo. In these regions kickbacks to officialdom have become so customary that they are almost quantifiable business costs.

The truth of the matter is that it is not only officialdom that is to blame—much less black officialdom. One of the most disturbing elements in the successive waves of corruption which have rocked homeland administrations is that whites have often been at the root of it—and that black officials are frequently merely the instruments through which they acquire their ill-gotten gains. Rank opportunists, or "Uhuru hoppers"—call them what you will, it is they who tend to manipulate the system most by insinuating themselves close to those in authority.

So endemic has graft and corruption become that the central government has become tacitly accepting of it. Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha admitted to parliament this year that something like 5 percent of the state's allocation towards homeland finances was misappropriated each year, adding that, in the African context, the wastage factor was "not bad." A sorry admission.

It is true that the amount of revenue contributed towards homeland finances from "own sources" has grown considerably over the years. One or two are getting to the point where they could conceivably become self-financing. But with South African taxpayers still contributing something like R6 billion annually (if all revenue is included) in the form of budgetary assistance to the TBVC states—and excluding the self-governing regions—there is a need for greater concern over expenditure.

The commission delving into the financial affairs of Transkei has recommended that tighter budgetary control is one way in which corruption could be minimised—a difficult task if the charade of homeland independence which SA presents to the world is to be maintained.

One positive development has been the formation of four Joint Financial Adjustment Committees—bilateral bodies comprising officials of the affected administrations—to oversee future spending.

While ostensibly not detracting from the carefully cultivated sovereignty SA's vassal states enjoy, they will subtly guide the hand that signs the cheques.

A special committee has been established to examine the efficacy of government's decentralisation policy and its attendant incentive packages—an area long suspected of being vulnerable.

A total of R500m is apparently spent each year in facilitating industrial decentralisation to the homelands—much of which is alleged to somehow find its way into various back pockets. Retroactive tax legislation should help stem the hemorrhage into cross-border tax havens at the expense of the South African exchequer. It is common cause that tax evasion scams perpetrated under Ciskei's benign "no corporate tax" environment has cost the South African fiscus millions each year.

There is another time-bomb—and one which PFP MP Harry Schwarz frequently refers to in parliament: Off-shore loans, running into many hundreds of millions, which the TBVC states have borrowed to fund their deficits.

At some point the piper will have to be paid. The burden is likely to fall on the South African taxpayer, since all homeland offshore borrowings have been guaranteed by Pretoria.

Homeland officials obviously do not start out with the intention of corrupting the system. But they often have scant political legitimacy among the people they are intended to represent—Mangosuthu Buthelezi is a notable exception.

As co-opted black leaders they begin in an invidious position; and the hostility directed at them for being "Pretoria's puppets" has been a potent factor in rural "unrest" these past 3 years.

Some of them—the overlords in KwaNdebele appear to be a case in point—are on the opposite side of their community.

Clearly, theirs is no easy role.

The consequence of being the butt of the community's derision could lead to a lowering of self-esteem, from which the slide into moral degradation—of which corruption is only one manifestation—cannot be too distant.

Cynics would no doubt say that government has been hoist by its own petard. By blindly following the Verwoerdian vision of separating out a "white" SA from the midst of a host of nominally independent black states, it has created a privileged and powerful elite reluctant to surrender the trappings of office.

It is axiomatic that black Mercedes-Benzes with pennants flying, luxury homes, plush legislative assembly buildings and national flags—even if they are hoisted upside down—are hallmarks of avariciousness not likely to be given up without protest.

Moreover, it would be naive to believe that the homelands could, in effect, be scuppered.

Recognised or not, they exist as defined if usually fragmented geographic entities and seem to square with the worldwide phenomenon towards stronger ethnic identification and autonomy, of which the Sikh and Tamil national movements in India and Sri Lanka are two examples.

Graft or no graft, homeland citizens are a mite better off than they were prior to independence, when they were irremediably locked by Group Areas and influx control into arid, remote dependencies.

That much even avowed critics of the system like TIME magazine acknowledge. Fuelled not doubt by the infusion of South African cash, GDP is rising in most, as is per capita income and the quality of life in general.

Yet not without reason government is becoming more circumspect about "independence" for the homelands. It's insistence that KwaNdebele's desire for autonomy should be tested at the polls is evidence that statehood is a favour not as lightly granted as it once was.

It is easy to be critical of the homeland leaders' style or shortcomings. The history of modern African is littered with corrupt despots. But in the final analysis it is SA itself that bears responsibility for its creations.

And while it might be easy, even fashionable, to joke about the antics of some homeland leaders, that must not be forgotten is that something like 20m people have to live under their maladministrations. The lesson surely must be that it is not the political kingdom held shakily in place by "aid" from Pretoria (which inflation constantly erodes to which blacks should aspire.

The means of greater participation in the market economy of the region imperfect thought it may be—should be the priority.

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MILITARY

Malan: RSA 'Top Arms Exporter'

34000147a Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
9 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Gerald Reilly: "SA 'A Top Arms Exporter'"]

[Text] Pretoria—SA was among the top dozen arms exporters in the world Defence Minister Magnus Malan said in Durban at the weekend.

Speaking at the Durban Club two days after the 10th anniversary of the UN's mandatory arms embargo on SA, he said Armscor had been outstandingly successful in keeping up with modern technology and modern systems, and was one the great success stories of present day SA.

Armscor and companies in the private sector manufactured all reasonable requirements of the SADF.

Ten years ago the United Nations asked its members not to sell weapons to SA; now it was asking them not to buy weapons from SA.

Apart from its primary function of supplying the SADF, the country's arms manufacturing industry had stimulated the economy as a whole, and thousands of jobs created.

Malan said that SA was a bastion of freedom and western civilisation.

"Our minerals are indispensable to the future wellbeing of the West and the Cape sea route is vital to western freedom. No amount of propaganda and disinformation by our enemies can argue this away," said Malan.

/06662

Campaign To Recruit Israeli Jet Fighter Engineers Underway

34000147b Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
10 Nov 87 p 3

[Article: "SA 'Recruiting Jet Fighter Engineers'"]

[Text] Jerusalem—SA has launched a campaign to attract hundreds of Israeli engineers who worked on the Lavi jet fighter before being fired when the project was scrapped recently, reports said yesterday.

The "Jerusalem Post" quoted unidentified sources as saying Pretoria had offered \$7,000 a month and generous transportation and housing allowances to 600 former employees of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI).

The newspaper also said SA was trying to attract key project officers still employed by IAI.

Officials in the Defence Ministry and IAI, along with the company's workers committee, refused to comment.

Several IAI employees said in September they had been offered large sums of money to move to SA, but at the time did not describe it as a systematic campaign by Pretoria.

About 3,000 IAI workers have been dismissed since the Israeli government, acting under US pressure, voted in August to scrap development of the over-budget Lavi, a mainly US-funded project. The plane was to have been Israel's first-line jet fighter of the 1990s.

An IAI official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the company could not stop former Lavi workers from accepting contracts in SA.

He would not disclose the average salary of former employees working on the Lavi, but said it was "a lot lower" than \$7,000.

Earlier this year Israel imposed a range of sanctions against SA, including a ban on new military contracts. But the restrictions apply only to contracts between the two governments, not to individuals.—Sapa-AP.

/06662

ECONOMIC

New Investments Give Big Boost to Black Business in Townships

34000123b Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English
16 Oct 87 p 79

[Text] Black business in urban townships will receive a major boost over the next two months with the opening of a series of new shop and office complexes costing more than R9m.

The four centres at Vosloorus near Boksburg, Jabulani and Moletsane, Soweto, and Mohlakeng near Randfontein will offer space to 96 emergent businesses and should help arrest the "leakage factor" which channels 90 percent-95 percent of black spending out of the townships to businesses in the cities.

As there is a dearth of shopping in black urban areas, blacks have been forced to do most of their shopping in "white" areas. The new move to provide quality shopping within their townships could reverse the trend.

Clearly, with a city like Soweto boasting a population of around 2m, the market is vast. And with the wage gap visibly narrowing, black affluence is growing.

The R5,6m, 6 950m(2) "one-stop" Lesedi City complex at Vosloorus (population 90,000 and growing) is situated next to a busy taxi terminal and features one of the "largest supermarkets in SA" with a floor area of 2 400 m(2). As with all 53 businesses in the complex, the supermarket will be black owned and managed by Gray Thathane, a local Vosloorus businessman.

Finance is being provided by the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC). Lesedi, the biggest shopping centre in any black metropolitan area to date, will be officially opened on November 28 and is expected to create jobs for about 1 000 blacks. The centre is already full let.

SBDC GM James Scott says it is a showcase of the SBDC's policy of acting as a catalyst for entrepreneurial development.

But while Lesedi is financed by the SBDC, other township centres are being jointly funded by the SBDC and the private sector. This is a new development which could presage major private sector support for black business. In the past, private sector financiers either shied away from the perceived risk, took equity in the SBDC, or backed organisations like the Urban Foundation.

The Ra-Ikagela Mall at Mohlakeng near Randfontein is 100 percent black owned and jointly funded by private developers, the SBDC and JCI. Herbert Maribi and Edward Peliso were the prime movers. They sold shares to 25 black shareholders, registered a property development company and contributed R150 000 towards costs.

"Ra-Ikagela motivated the project and raised funds through the SBDC and JCI. It was JCI, in fact, who made the whole project possible, with the SBDC acting as project coordinator. With JCI blazing the trail, hopefully we will soon see other groups following suit," says Scott.

Peliso says the trend today is towards independent operations. "Black people hate handouts. In the past there was a ceiling for black development in business. Now we find that the financing avenues are opening up

and that there is money for business development and job creation. The employees of yesterday are now becoming employers and developers," he says.

Soweto's new 1 900 m(2) Jabulani and 2 700 m(2) Tsele shopping centres are much smaller than Lesedi City, but tenant interest is high. At Jabulani, one fast-food shop drew 50 applications.

At the Pennyville "industrial hive" on the outskirts of Soweto about 200 small business tenants already provide 600 jobs. Essential equipment can be rented, while the SBDC's *Contactmaker* magazine offers a shopwindow to big business of what these small entrepreneurs can offer.

In another example of joint SBDC/private sector financing of black business, Sanlam will fund 50 percent of a new R2m, three-storey office complex in Dube, Soweto. The nearby Dube industrial park—the first in a black urban area—is fully let and expanding.

The R1,8m Tsele shopping centre in Moletsane, Soweto—to be opened on December 5—is the brainchild of local businessman Peter Tsele and is jointly funded by the SBDC and Southern Life. It is ideally situated adjacent to the busy Merafe station, a ready catchment for the 22 businesses in the centre.

But while these investments could be pointers to a new dawn for black business, obtaining land from the local town councils remains a problem. As the black townships were originally designed as "dormitory towns," little or no provision was made for commercial and industrial zonings.

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Electricity Sales to Neighboring Countries Increasing

34000123a Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* in English 16 Oct 87 p 80

[Text] The November tripartite talks between SA, Mozambique and Portugal on the better utilisation of Mozambique's massive Cahora Bassa hydro-power project has highlighted: regional power relationships in the sub-continent.

Cahora Bassa, 80 percent owned by Portugal, has for years been a proverbial "white elephant" in the bush. The pylons linking the Zambezi dam with the Transvaal were regularly sabotaged by Renamo rebels fighting their civil war.

But this week's Lisbon meeting of Foreign Minister Pik Botha and his Portuguese counterpart Joao Pinheiro could have set the stage for an easing of political and economic relationships between SA and Mozambique—and a more free flow of Cahora Bassa power to SA.

It also highlights the well-known vision Eskom CE Ian McRae and other senior Eskom officials have of creating a southern African power network, linking SA with its neighbouring states. Until now, political considerations have always thwarted this ideal.

Nevertheless, Eskom electricity sales to neighbouring states rose by 18.9 percent in the year ending August 1987. Eskom public affairs manager Ewald Thal says SA supplied 100 percent of Maputo's electricity—which accounts for 60 percent of Mozambique's entire requirements, or 57 MW—in the past financial year.

Eskom also supplies 100 percent of Lesotho's electricity requirements (27 MW last year). Other states using Eskom power include Botswana (37 MW or 30 percent-40 percent of the country's demand), Swaziland (66 MW or around 60 percent of the country's power needs), Zimbabwe (3 MW or 3 percent) and Namibia (66 MW).

In addition, Eskom provides power for the local national states—37 MW for Bophuthatswana last year and 16 MW for Transkei.

There can be no doubt that countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia could profit from the export of their power resources to SA. "The political problems are as great as ever, but there is an interdependence in the region which cannot be gainsaid," says McRae.

Thal is at pains to emphasise that electricity exports to neighbouring countries have to be seen in perspective. "The Carlton Centre in Johannesburg alone consumes around 60 MW a year, while a major gold mine would use far more electricity annually than any of our neighbouring states," he said.

He also makes the point that any two of Eskom's six new "six-pack" power stations (so-called because each comprises six 600 MW-650 MW power generating units) could supply the electricity needs of the whole of Africa north of the Limpopo.

/12913

Emigrating Chartered Accountants Forming Part of Brain Drain

34000149a Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
2 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Helen Wishart: "Emigrating CAs Now Also Part of SA's Brain-drain"]

[Text] Chartered accountants are leaving the country in droves, but the serious "brain-drain" of actuaries seems to have slowed.

This emerged from figures provided by professional bodies.

A Public Accountants and Auditors Board spokesperson said 67 practising CAs had emigrated this year, compared with 38 for the same period last year.

In 1986, 567 candidates passed the board exam and qualified as CAs, while 561 passed in 1987.

Transvaal Society of Chartered Accountants spokesman MJ van Rensburg estimated an average of 14 practising and non-practising CAs had left the Transvaal every month during 1987.

About 40 of the 150 practising actuaries left SA last year to end January. The number emigrating has dropped to 10 so far this year.

About 19 actuaries qualified in 1986 and 13 have qualified this year.

Institute and Faculty of Actuaries SA education representative Mary Hill said an increasingly number of students appeared to be enrolling for university actuarial courses, rather than for the institute exams. There were presently about 150 institute/faculty students on her books.

Meanwhile, CIS CE Alan Barrable said there had been a 20

increase in student registration numbers for the SA Institute of Chartered Secretaries exams compared with last year's figures—5,700 students to end September compared with 4,800 for the same period last year.

Barrable said this was "a positive sign for the short to medium term future of SA business".

Reasons for the increase included "the vacuum created by emigration" and "the extent to which the institute has repositioned itself over the past 12 months".

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Increased Production of Local Stainless Steel Urged

34000149b Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL* (Stainless Steel suppl.) in English 2 Nov 87 p 3

[Article: "Why Give It Away?"]

[Text] SA has enormous mineral wealth. It's time to stop others reaping the benefits.

SA has an estimated 85 percent of the world's chromite reserves and accounts for one-third of current global production of 11m tons. In 1985 alone, raw chromite exports earned nearly R150m.

At first glance, that is an impressive export achievement. Seen another way, however, it becomes clear that SA is exporting millions of tons of raw material for others to add value.

Chromite is the raw material for stainless steel. It is smelted into ferrochromium, 95 percent of which is used in stainless manufacture. By exporting, we are allowing others to create the stainless steel products that compete with our own. Logic dictates that local industry should make better use of the resources on its doorstep.

The local beneficiation argument is one that has been applied to many of SA's plentiful mineral deposits. We dig them from the ground and make a comfortable profit by exporting them overseas. But in doing so, we deny our industries the opportunities to make full use of those materials.

Mintek's Aidan Edwards has suggested that chromium beneficiation could provide SA with more earnings than the gold industry.

In the case of stainless steel, chromite mining provides an estimated 10,000 jobs in SA, with most of the production leaving the country. Why export something that can be used overseas to inhibit the development of our own downstream industries?

By keeping it in this country and creating major beneficiation industries, we provide huge advantages for downstream production. No one suggests we halt exports of chromite or the next stage in the chain, ferrochromium. Rather, industry leaders say, we must have first bit at it.

In 1985, chromite exports earned R150m. According to one scenario, this could rise 66 percent to R260m (at 1985 values) by 2010. The projected growth in downstream industries would be greater. Ferrochromium industry earnings could more than double from R820m to R1.9bn; primary stainless steel exports increase more than 10 times from R120m to R1.7bn; and fabricated product earnings fifty-fold from R30m to R1.5bn.

If achieved, the impact on employment would be dramatic. Employment in chromium mining would rise from 10,000 to 25,000, in ferrochromium smelting from 5,000 to 13,000, in primary stainless production from 2,200 to 10,000, and in fabrication from 12,500 to 45,000.

But growth like that doesn't come cheap. To reap those rewards, the industry as a whole would have to increase investment by more than R11bn in the next 20 years.

Investment of this magnitude will require some digestion—perhaps create indigestion—and all other possible avenues and alternatives will have to be investigated to achieve the same result at a lower cost.

The accompanying chart shows how, under the industry strategy, raw mineral exports will decline in relation to world production, while downstream products will increase their share.

Part-way beneficiation alone, of course, won't help the industry. Some voices have suggested all that has to be done is build another mill to produce a million tons of stainless steel a year, and the problem is solved.

It's not that easy. What is the point of an extra 1m tons if there is no market—locally or internationally—to absorb it?

That is why the stainless steel industry's strategy for the 1990s must be seen as a two-pronged one. It must combine beneficiation with a determined marketing drive to increase stainless steel penetration of local and international markets, but adding the investment in manageable chunks.

Industry leaders admit, however, that they can't achieve all their objectives alone. In a world of protectionism and government-subsidised export industries, they need some assistance from the SA government.

The Board of Trade and Industry (BTI) is looking at industries worthy of support.

Among the ideas being developed by industry officials for consideration are investment incentives, export incentives, adequate domestic market protection from imports, and establishment of export processing zones (EPZ).

These are demarcated areas enjoying different tariff and protection laws.

Nor would the industry be averse to a managed rand exchange rate to make SA exports more attractive on world markets. Venture capital is another avenue to be explored, as is, for example, flexible inland transport rates.

Industry mood is that concerted chromium beneficiation would be of such advantage to the economy—in terms of wealth-creation, export earnings and jobs, that it deserves every support it may be given. The country has the potential for huge wealth, the industry says. Why give it away?

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Black Interest in Home Ownership Increasing
34000125a Johannesburg THE STAR in English
3 Nov 87 p 22

[Text] An indication of the mounting interest in black homeownership is seen in the latest figures from the Natal Building Society.

In April to July this year, lending to black homeowners jumped by a massive 272 percent on the same period last year.

Mr Trevor Olivier, assistant general manager loans of the NBS, said at the key presentation ceremony at a housing development near Newcastle: "The sooner people get a foot on the homeownership ladder the better, for we predict that in three to four years, prices of homes could double from their present levels."

Mr Olivier said that in one area of social responsibility, Government was showing the way and the private sector was being too slow to follow its lead.

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SOCIAL

SAIRR Social Economic Update Issues Third Quarter Report

Government Spending on Black Services Still Increasing

34000148 Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English
9 Nov 87 p 11

[Text] The Government has continued to significantly increase its direct spending on black facilities and services, despite an intention in many areas to phase this out, the South African Institute of Race Relations' social and economic update for the third quarter has reported.

An indication of this was the preliminary spending estimates by regional services councils, some of which were firmly committed to devoting most of their resources to township upgrading.

The Government was also subsidising the mortgage repayment of coloured homeowners, while subsidies for black passenger transport continued to rise.

"Even its spending on health, where a shortage of funds had prompted a decline in standards, has increased by a higher percentage than the inflation rate.

"There is also growing evidence that announced Government allocations for township upgrading reflect only a portion of total spending.

"Money for this purpose is being provided by provincial grants, loans to black local authorities and by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which now finances projects in urban areas, such as the East Rand.

"The full cost of upgrading by the security system's joint management centres is also unclear. One estimate is that the Government will spend R200-m this year on Soweto alone."

Levies May Have To Increase

The key question, the update said, was whether this spending could generate sufficient momentum to sustain development.

"The Government will be unable to sustain the burden indefinitely without cutting into white spending. Its strategy is based on the belief that present spending will generate self-sustaining development and that the need for its contribution will steadily decrease. Evidence in the past quarter suggests this may not occur."

The update argued that RSCs were unlikely to significantly dent township's various backlogs with their present resources. Funding levies may have to increase fivefold "to make their intended impact on township conditions".

The inherited backlogs created by decades of apartheid may be so great that substantial government spending will be needed to reduce them.

"The prospects for self-sustaining development which could significantly dent racial backlogs seem limited and high levels of government spending may still be needed if even modest progress is to be made in reducing them."

Highlights of the quarter were:

—Escom's plan which may allow electricity to be extended to black townships.

—Some RSC budgets allocated the bulk of their spending to township infrastructure.

—The President's Council report on the Group Areas Act recommended racial restrictions on the development of new areas be dropped.

—Some 11,000 ha of land was set aside for black housing—double the amount released in the previous quarter.

—A Department of Education and Training committee recommended improvements to the black rural schools system.

Apartheid Pressure on Transport

34000148 Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English
9 Nov 87 p 11

[Text] Apartheid will continue to force authorities to choose between mounting transport subsidies and sharp fare increases.

This is the conclusion of the South African Institute of Race Relations' latest "Social and Economic Update."

In its report on transport, it said that the Government saw deregulation as a partial solution to mounting subsidies and fare increases.

However, while increased competition could improve black transport delivery in some areas, it could further hamper it in others.

This would occur, for example, if increased competition with business on its profitable services forced the South African Transport Services (Sats) to abandon or increase the costs of black passenger services.

The SAIRR report said that the Government's policy on subsidisation remained unclear.

"It now seems less likely that Regional Services Councils (RSCs) will be expected to take over subsidies, but it is unclear whether the Government is seeking another subsidy formula or whether it will continue to bear the burden itself."

The report said the pressure on black passenger transport was illustrated most clearly by Putco's attempt to sell its assets.

Energy Supplies To Black Areas Delayed

34000148 Johannesburg THE STAR in English
9 Nov 87 p 11

[Article: "Power Supply Is Hampered"]

[Text] The main problems delaying the supply of electrification services to black areas is the general unwillingness of white local authorities to supply the funds, and the inability of black local authorities to provide the money.

The latest "Social and Economic Update" report of the South African Institute of Race Relations says R74 million is needed to clear the electrification backlog in the central Witwatersrand alone.

Studies by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) estimate that by the year 2000 about half the black homes in urban areas will still be without electricity.

Another answer to the backlog in energy for black communities could be the use of simpler energy sources. One expert feels solar energy seems to have the greatest potential in the short to medium term.

Authorities appear to regard the electrification of black areas as a priority, the CSIR report says. Another priority is the installation of water points.

Only a third of houses in Soweto and Diepmeadow have running water inside. The rest must rely on an outside water supply.

A costly upgrading programme has been initiated in Alexandra township just outside Johannesburg, with the supply of drinking water the first priority, and water-borne sewage the second.

The Development Bank is promoting the introduction of water kiosks, which sell purified water.

Education Disparities Highlighted

34000148 Johannesburg THE STAR in English
9 Nov 87 p 11

[Text] Vast disparities remain in spending on education for the four race groups, as well as in key indicators such as teacher-pupil ratios, teacher qualifications and classrooms, says the SA Institute for Race Relations' latest "Social and Economic Update."

The education update said it therefore remained doubtful that racial parity in education could be achieved in South Africa in the foreseeable future.

It highlighted the following disparities:

—Spending on the primary and secondary education of each child for each race in 1986 was R2,746 for whites, R1,952 for Indians, R1,330 for coloured and R395 for blacks (including the "independent" homelands).

However, the update noted that the trend to increase government resources for black education continued, while there was evidence that spending on white education was being cut back.

Budgeted State spending on the separate racial departments increased by 8.77 percent for whites, 16.1 percent for coloureds, 10.46 percent for Indians and 25 percent for blacks outside the homelands.

Shortage

Further analysis of budgets suggested that priority was being given to the homelands, most of whose education budgets rose higher than the Department of Education and Training (DET).

—Teacher-pupil ratios for each race in 1986, including the homelands, were: 1 to 13 for whites, 1 to 18 for coloureds, 1 to 18 for Indians and 1 to 35 for blacks.

The Department of Education and Training (DET), says if a ratio of 1 to 30 was used as a norm, there was a shortage of 12,079 teachers in its schools—11,613 in primary and 466 in secondary schools.

By contrast, 590 white teachers were made redundant in 1986 and the first quarter of 1987 and certain white teacher training colleges were earmarked for closure.

The report said that according to a senior Government education policy-maker interviewed, the authorities would not allow black students to attend white colleges despite the shortage of black teacher training facilities. They might allow white colleges which were closed to re-open for blacks only, but only if they were not situated in a white residential area.

—Teacher qualifications: About 56 percent of black teachers in DET schools had neither senior certificate nor matriculation in 1986, compared with 63 percent in 1985, said the report.

—Classroom shortages for each race in 1986, based on the norm of 40 pupils per classroom in primary and 35 in secondary schools, was 38,641 for blacks (including the homelands), 5,400 for coloureds and 587 for Indians.

The black classroom shortage was broken down into 5,384 in DET schools, 23,713 in non-independent homelands and 9,544 in independent homelands.

The report said at least R850 million would be required to eliminate this shortage. Last year, the DET built 435 new classrooms at existing schools and 1,361 at new schools.

The surplus of white classrooms in 1985, when there were 153,637 empty places, was 3,840.

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New Right-Wing Afrikaner Organization Faces Government Clampdown
34000145b Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Nov 87, p 4

[Article by David Brier: "Battle for the Soul of the Afrikaner Youth"]

[Text] Government trouble-shooters are hot on the trail of a secret organisation for right-wing Afrikaans teachers in a growing battle for the soul of Afrikaner youth.

Mr Albert Nothnagel, Nat MP for Innesdal, who is investigating right-wing activities in education in a bid to rid the classrooms of politics, told "The Sunday Star" this weekend he had come across the trail of a group known as the Afrikaner-onderwysers-kultuurorganisasie (AOK) (The Afrikaner Teachers' Cultural Organisation).

"It is involved in blatant rightist politics and has as little to do with culture as the man on the moon," he said.

Mr Nothnagel added he would send documentation on the AOK to the Minister of Education and Culture, Mr Piet Clase.

But Dr Andries Treurnicht, leader of the CP, pointed out that the Nats had previously promoted this outlook themselves "in their hey-day".

The chairman of the AOK is Mr W W de Vos, principal of Laerskool Louis Leipoldt in Verwoerdburg. He is believed to be a Conservative Party supporter.

Mr de Vos was reported this weekend as denying the AOK was a political organisation, saying it was purely cultural.

But Mr Nothnagel compared it to other right-wing "cultural" organisations such as the Afrikaner Volkswag which promoted the views of the far-Right.

The AOK was formed about two years ago and has spread well beyond the Pretoria area where it was first established.

In a recent newsletter the AOK spelt out the role of teachers in preserving the God-given ideal of separate nations and languages in a world which favoured integration and equality.

The newsletter encouraged members to send in the names of colleagues "who belong with us" so that AOK's membership could grow.

The Government is preparing to fire another two volleys against far right-wing forces in the battle.

A draft Bill is being prepared in secret to prohibit all political activity by teachers, it was disclosed this week.

If the Bill is passed, teachers will no longer be able to further any party-political interests.

The move amounts to a reaction to the political activities of teachers with far-right sympathies who are becoming increasingly outspoken both inside the classroom and outside, political sources believe.

It is clearly aimed at the far-right, according to political observers. No such law was introduced when there were past complaints about pro-Nat teachers influencing their pupils.

And a new policy on school sport is on the cards to exclude from mixed sports events those schools which refuse to play against mixed teams. This is a reversal of the current policy which excludes schools with mixed teams if there are objections.

These two moves form part of the ongoing battle between the two competing forces in Afrikanerdom for control of Afrikaner institutions and to influence the minds of the youth.

The two measures were discussed recently by the four provincial education councils, it was disclosed this week.

Dr Andries Treurnicht, leader of the CP, told "The Sunday Star," that the CP's support was growing among the youth.

"In the hey-day of the NP, they promoted this outlook," he said.

But now that the Nats had opted for "multiracialism" he added, the CP had taken over the traditional Nat "volk" philosophy.

He agreed that party politics should be kept out of schools. But said giving pupils a "culture-oriented" education would inevitably play a role in the future political thinking of the youth.

The struggle between these two forces involves all institutions, including Parliament, municipalities, church councils and school boards.

Thousands of Afrikaner teenagers now at school will be eligible to vote in next year's municipal elections and in the Parliamentary elections which could be held as soon as 1989.

Statistics of the May 6 general election for whites show that a relatively small swing could tip the balance in favour of the CP in the Transvaal and Free State.

The Right has yet to make a comparable impact in the Cape and Natal.

Young voters will play a crucial role in this balance, especially in the Transvaal and Free State.

Mr Roger Burrows, Progressive Federal Party spokesman on education, said he was aware of the struggle at educational level between the NP and CP.

"The NP is concerned that the emotional call to blood which they previously used for their own purposes, is now being used by the CP."

He said banning teachers' party political activities would not prevent teachers from influencing their pupils on racist lines in the classrooms. He suggested this proposed law could be ineffective as it did not touch on classroom activities.

He pointed out that both the Federal Teachers' Council and the Transvaalse Onderwysersvereniging had repudiated Mr Nothnagel.

Mr Nothnagel told "The Sunday Star" that the CP and its allies were following a strategy of infiltrating school committees with a view to indoctrinating pupils. "It is in the interests of South Africa to prevent this happening," he said.

He said this had nothing to do with cultural pride, as suggested by Dr Treurnicht. "It is blatant racism by a small group of teachers to awaken self-pride in children by insulting others," he said.

"There is no way anyone can stop those people who want to integrate in a country like South Africa," he said.

And on PFP suggestions that the CP was merely doing what the Nats had done in previous years, Mr Nothnagel said: "I am not interested in what happened in the past. I am concerned with the interests of the country and the future. We must not raise our children for a better past but for a better future".

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Students Say Security Presence on Turfloop Campus Demoralizing

34000144b Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 8 Nov 87 p 8

[Article by Jon Qwelane: "The Alternative University"; Reporter Jon Qwelane went to the University of the North (Turfloop) to find out what policing itself has done to the institution, and if Wits' Professor Charlton is correct in saying: "It is no longer a university; it is the game lost." Passages in boldface as published.]

[Text] "Those who advocate the harshest approach to discipline should look at the effects of that approach on other campuses in our country. There is quiet under military occupation on one campus (University of the North). That is no longer a university. That is the game lost." —Professor Robert Charlton, vice-chancellor-elect of Wits

Students at the University of the North (Turfloop)) say they always know, without reading or hearing about it in the media, when there is an escalation of hostilities on the border: the sudden reduction of the number of soldiers resident on campus is always a reliable indicator.

Last week a number of "liberal" universities held mass gatherings to protest against threats to their autonomy and against their leaders being asked to act as agents of the State.

Turfloop students, perhaps harshly, say their university has never had any autonomy, and add that it has been an active agent for State security since the beginning of this year.

So what is the state of Turfloop today?

—There is a 24-hour presence of police and soldiers, with the campus being patrolled most of the day and throughout the night.

—There is no students representative council. The lot were taken into custody last year and there has been no attempt to revive the SRC because, students say, anyone who did so would simply be knocking at the detention-cell door.

—Except for lectures, no meetings of any kind take place on the campus. Students complain their study groups at night are monitored.

—So tight is the clampdown, students say, that there are no debates on campus, and mild social gatherings such as film shows are heavily monitored by members of the Lebowa police and the "Sadafs."

"Sadafs" is the name students have given SA Defence Force members resident on campus.

—Access to the campus is gained by producing a student card; outsiders register at the gates, and the purpose and duration of their visit are recorded.

—Cars are not readily permitted into the campus. If they are allowed in, they are first searched.

—Students complain the security forces regularly inspect notice boards and destroy any notices or cartoons they do not like.

—The "intimidating" presence of the security forces on campus is such that students can meet in significant numbers only outside the campus. Even then, they surreptitiously pass word around about such get-togethers; otherwise, groups of students are broken up.

The rector, Professor Poth Mokgokong, did not answer a detailed telex THE SUNDAY STAR sent him on Thursday listing the complaints voiced by students, as well as the markedly different university Turfloop is now from what it was in the past.

Also queried in the telex was whether there is a detention cell on campus and whether students' complaints about allegedly provocative behaviour by security forces on the campus are valid.

The head of Lebowa's security forces, Colonel P Moloto, could not be reached either. He is nominally in charge of those enforcing law in the northern Transvaal homeland.

Says a student from Lebowa-kgomo: "You'd imagine they would be happy now that they've locked up our SRC. But after a year of no SRC activity on the campus they are still clamping down on any attempt to establish some form of student representation."

If there is no SRC on campus, how are students' grievances aired and conveyed to the university authorities?

A student from Seshego says: "The moment you have a grievance you are branded a troublemaker. Anyway, you must go through a long line of people before you reach the right person. We have stopped complaining, and the authorities like it that way. They imagine if they hear no complaints it means there are no complaints."

Students say they are viewed suspiciously if they are seen in small groups of four or five. If they want to discuss anything to do with their lot on campus, a meeting is planned for the nearby shopping complex or somewhere "safe".

Security at the entrance to the campus is tight.

The men stationed there do not simply glance at students' identity cards; they study the photograph while peering closely at the student, and sometimes ask the student for his number and compare what he says with the computer-printed number on his card.

Students say it is disconcerting to see armed men walking up and down outside lecture halls while lectures are in progress.

"How can we learn anything when we are virtually in an operational zone? Soldiers have taken over the sports field. They have pitched tents there and the dressing rooms at the stadium have been converted into sleeping quarters. There is even a detention cell in that camp," says one student.

Other students say the existence of a detention cell on campus is a fact, and they know of colleagues who have been held there.

Would a mass protest of the size of last Wednesday's at Wits be possible at Turfloop?

"Such a protest would not be possible at Turfloop because the authorities here are an extension of the Government. They do as the Government tells them and ask no questions. There is no university autonomy; the Sadafs and Lebowa police run the campus, not the constituted staff," says an Atteridgeville student.

Turfloop has been a hotbed of dissent since the day 15 years ago when the late Onkgopotse Tiro, then SRC president, delivered a sharp attack on Bantu Education.

The university ordered him to apologise but he refused. He was expelled, triggering a wave of protest and lecture boycotts at other black campuses across the country that heralded the student protests of the 1970s and 1980s.

Every year since then there have been various incidents at Turfloop, and almost every year has seen disruptions resulting in temporary closure of the campus.

Last year the entire white academic staff left their jobs when one of their colleagues was allegedly splashed with acid. He was a particularly unpopular lecturer, having been accused of making racist remarks.

Once the Government appointed a judicial commission to inquire into the dissidence at Turfloop and, after a year of collecting evidence, the Snyman Commission's findings were a damning indictment of the system of education at black universities.

The Government's severe clampdown on the University of the North has resulted in "quiet under military occupation". But it also renders Professor Charlton correct: "That is no longer a university. That is the game lost."

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Northern Transvaal Population Lives Under Siege Mentality

34000145a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English
13 Nov 87 p 6

[Article by Patrick Bulger: "War Is a Growth Industry up North"]

[Text] Outside the magistrate's court in this northern Transvaal town just south of the Limpopo River a woman is holding an artificial limb; nearby one of a group of bristly-haired men is playing with a set of leg irons.

Inside court five tables have been laid out with the kit alleged to have belonged to two African National Congress insurgents. There are biscuits, orange juice powder and snuff from Zimbabwe; rifles and bullets from the Soviet Union.

A little later the exhibits are covered with grey blankets in a manner that suggests corpses.

Into this macabre setting shuffle the accused: Mthetheli Mncube, 27, and Mzondeleli Nondula, 24. Their leg irons rattle as they walk.

Mncube, the State alleges, trained in Angola where he "underwent an intensive six-week course in the use of weapons and the killing of people". He is wearing what appears to be a Springbok tracksuit.

These are some of the many images of a protracted and historic war taking place up north.

In its frontier aspect, it echoes the war Afrikaner trekboers once waged against indigenous tribes like the Pedi. In the Eighties their opponents are more likely to be urban men well travelled in Eastern Bloc countries.

It would be mistaken to say the Afrikaner has learned to live with war—on the contrary, conflict has been an integral part of his historical development. War is all pervasive; its imperatives conditioning now, as in the past, Afrikaner political and social structures.

Sometimes the enemy can be seen, caught and brought to court—but more often than not the enemy is believed to be a faceless force masked as liberalism, "soft attitudes" towards blacks. Xenophobia is an important contribution to the war psychosis of the northern frontier.

More practically, war is a growth industry in the north—its presence not only shapes social attitudes but forms an important part of cultural life.

The "Noord Transvaler," a newspaper serving the north, reports on what has become a traditional farmers' day in the region.

A Commandant Pretorius, the paper reports, addressed a farmers' gathering outside Ellisras, a railway junction that has had more than its fair share of landmine attacks.

People must feel free to discuss any problem they have with the SA Defence Force, he said. He told farmers about the assault against SA on all fronts—"social, economic, military and political".

The report continues: "Later that day, police destroyed a vehicle about one kilometre away to demonstrate the impact of a landmine". There were also displays of "Russian weapons, hand-grenades, landmines, hand-made dolls, and leatherwork".

War has an important economic function in the northern Transvaal. There is hardly a single larger town in the area that does not derive some benefit from the proliferation of security institutions.

The spending power alone that comes with police stations, Air Force bases and Army camps is phenomenal and well recognised as such.

Far from disdaining war and what comes with it, Northern Transvaal towns are only too eager to get their share of the benefits flowing from a permanent war-footing.

The Nylstroom Post reports somewhat sulkily that in spite of having made SA Police Commissioner General Hendrik de Witt an honorary citizen of the town, "the police did not build their pleasure resort in Nylstroom". Consolation was to be had, however, from the announcement that the SAP would build a R20m divisional headquarters there.

In another report in the "Noord Transvaler," Defence Minister Magnus Malan opened an Air Force base in Louis Trichardt. He speaks plainly about "the new job opportunities and the buying power that will be stimulated as a result of the large numbers of people working at the base".

It is no coincidence that it is precisely in the areas most threatened by insurgent warfare that the call for an independent Boerestaat has been strongest. Boerestaat proponents believe their "mini-state" would mark a decisive break with the spoiled, metropolitan Afrikaners further south.

It would leave the Boere of the north free to wage their "good fight"—a state whose citizens would not flinch to take up arms when and how they see fit.

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Options for Opposition Politics, Resistance Movements Discussed

34000126b Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS in English Oct/Nov 87 pp 3-6

[First paragraph WORK IN PROGRESS Introduction]

[Text] Black resistance in the 1980s has involved the politics of a relatively advanced industrial society. Changes in South Africa's economy in the 1960s and 1970s, and in particular the movement of Africans into the most vital sectors of the industrial workforce during those years, form the two most distinctive features of black South African protest: its strength and its radicalism.

Many of the mass movements in the present conflict are socially and intellectually more substantial and sophisticated than in previous generations of protest.

The vanguard role of youth, the clear presence of class analysis in political discourse, the emphasis on democratic participation, the readiness to challenge the state's legitimacy, and the often violent antipathy between rivals: all are features of modern black politics which set it apart from what has been before.

The sense of impending victory and the consciousness of power which, until recently, was implicit and sometimes explicit in the discourse of radical black leadership, was not really justified.

In contrast to the 1950s, popular organisations during 1984-86 presented the authorities with a much more potent challenge to the working of government and the functioning of the economy. But the balance of power did not involve stalemate, as certain radical analyses would have. For conflict in the 1980s has in part been caused by government efforts to alter the terms of domination; trying to shift from an order based largely on coercion, to one where ideology, consensus, and incorporation could play rather larger roles. White South Africa's probable future prosperity-but not its very survival-hinged upon the success of these efforts.

Changes introduced by the government were not all meaningless. In the case of labour, the 1979 legislation institutionalised trade unions, which are now a vital

element in resistance and power. But outside the sphere of labour the government's programme held back from any significant concession of political rights, any division of the essentials of political authority, or any meaningful broadening of the system of political participation.

Despite their inadequacy, their tendency to raise expectations rather than fulfil them, the government's reforms had positive implications for the development of popular opposition. For the reforms themselves demanded a lessening of official restrictions and controls, and created a legal space for the open mobilisation of resistance to apartheid.

But it was a brief springtime. And like such springs elsewhere, it was followed not by a blossoming into summer, but a particularly harsh winter. Between 1986 and 1987 there was a shift in state strategy. Government's limited tolerance of radical dissent is over: it is replacing, through repression, the short-lived attempt to rule on the basis of legitimisation. And when it comes to coercion, the state's resources are still far greater than those which can be marshalled by the forces of popular resistance. There is no stalemate, and the state can still tear apart the body of organised political activity.

What is questionable, though, is whether the psychological effects of doing so will be as durable as was the case after the state's clamp-down at the beginning of the 1960s. The culture of black political radicalism may be much more resilient this time.

The options for resistance politics

The choices which currently face resistance politics are not the same as those faced by the leaders of the 1960s. Their options did not appear to be choices at all: acceptance of the massive force and authority of the state, and 'working within the system'; or clandestine organisation linked to the promotion of guerilla warfare.

These are not the only routes now. Guerilla warfare remains important. But it is not the only option in resistance politics. In the last ten years of guerilla insurgency, its significance has been political rather than military. The ANC itself described the first stage of its campaign as 'armed propaganda'. Though there have been strategic developments since then, the main purpose of guerilla attacks remains symbolic and inspirational, to provide political pointers.

It is unlikely that, in the near future, the military struggle will seriously be able to disrupt or threaten the functioning of the government or the economy. The ANC has been restraining its forces, but that restraint has been qualitative rather than quantitative. The ANC could, if it wished to, more effectively terrorise the cities and the suburbs. It could attack targets so far not chosen: schools, public transport, shopping centres; targets

selected so as to maximise white casualties. The ANC is strongly opposed to doing this for moral and strategic reasons, but it probably has the resources to undertake such a campaign.

What the ANC cannot do is mount a major military or sabotage offensive which would tie up large numbers of South African soldiers. This would have the same debilitating effects on the South African economy as the war in Zimbabwe did in its final stages.

But South African conditions are different from those which existed in Zimbabwe. To field and supply a guerilla army of several thousand inside the country's borders would be well beyond the ANC's logistical resources, and would require a completely different regional political economy.

Guerilla warfare will remain just one theme in the struggle. While it will be a major aspect, its importance will remain chiefly psychological. It will signal the ANC's presence. It will provide a medium through which the ANC can exercise its authority, and can enhance its status internationally. But for a long time it is unlikely to accomplish more than this. And even in the long term, the probabilities are against a militarily-based 'seizure of power'. Like most anti-colonial struggles, this one is almost certain to end through talks.

Another option for resistance politics would be to turn back the clock: to forget that the UDF and the popular political movement it commanded existed; forget that open political mobilisation was beginning to alter the political landscape, and retreat into a kind of defeatist syndicalism.

This syndicalist position would argue that political struggle and opposition should be left to the labour movement: to the extent that black people have power, it is grounded in labour relations and the strategic position black workers hold in the economy. An extension of this argument would suggest that this power should be conserved to protect labour organisation until it can fight the truly decisive battle another day.

This is not a realistic option. Firstly, given the present economic situation and its likely future development, a labour movement left to itself is unlikely to grow much stronger. Secondly, power held in reserve and not actually exercised may not turn out to be as powerful as was thought. Thirdly, the one kind of political challenge the authorities are really well-equipped to deal with is the general strike or general stayaway.

And it is worth remembering that the popular movement which mushroomed so dramatically in the townships in the 1983-86 period actually won victories. It won a succession of local struggles, compelling local representatives of state and capital to recognise black political power and negotiate with it.

The popular movement also won national victories. Analyses of state strategy produced before 1984, contrasted with what appears to be on the agenda today, make this obvious. The UDF was established to oppose, amongst other things, the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, which aimed at streamlining and tightening up influx control. Today, government policy in that area is wholly disorganised. And the abolition of influx control, despite the 'ifs and buts', represents a momentous victory, a signal advance.

But more than anything else, what has changed since the early 1980s is the question of whether the government has a strategy. It did then - or appeared to: indeed the left attributed to the state an almost Machiavellian intelligence. Today the state no longer has a coherent strategy. In 1983, the tricameral system was the final blueprint; today it is conceived of by government as merely 'a step in the process'.

Alliance politics and negotiation

It would be a mistake to turn the clock back, and write off the gains achieved by the politics of popular mobilisation. But conditions have changed.

The substructure of local organisation, which provided the UDF with its undertow of such force, is badly fragmented. In certain areas it is considerably demoralised. Where organisation can be repaired it should be. But where the state has concentrated its resources this may not be possible. When the SABC ventures into Alexandra township, then something which existed is now lost.

In place of the open structures constructed in the heyday of people's power, more discreet, clandestine or underground networks may be built. But these are not the only strategic alternatives.

And by its very nature, 'underground' politics is difficult to make democratic. In any case, mobilisation does not depend merely on the presence of committed activists, whether in the open or underground. It requires ideas, causes, issues and victories - both psychological and real.

It may still be possible to reconstruct the resistance movement around bread and butter preoccupations, the localised subsistence politics so fundamental to the building of 'first level' organisations before the UDF was formed. It is certainly the case that many effective local activists have tended to be absorbed by national structures and have become preoccupied with problems removed from the immediate needs of their constituencies.

But a return to localism would be a retreat. Local issues should not be neglected, for there are many victories to be won. The rent strike still effective in Soweto is a case in point. But local struggles do not effectively challenge the state, and do not rearrange the equation of political power.

Some of these considerations may be influencing the astute move by democratic organisations into alliance politics. The last three years have profoundly shaken up the white community's political culture. Divisions and demoralisations are more evident than they have been for decades.

It may not be possible to persuade more than an active minority of whites to join the camp of liberation politics. But a much larger proportion may have their fears lessened if movements like the UDF actively co-operate with forces and organisations which, in white political culture, have institutional respectability.

A large proportion of whites may be receptive to the leadership of a broad front around the call for negotiation. Events like the launch of the 'Friends of the UDF' in the plush surrounds of the Carlton Hotel, or the UDF's participation, along with IDASA and PFP notables, in the Five Freedoms Forum conference, make excellent sense.

Reassessing strategy

Once predominantly black democratic organisations begin co-operating across the lines which strategically and ideologically divide parliamentary from extra-parliamentary forces, then sooner or later a fundamental question must be asked about the boycottist position. This has been elevated almost to a point of principle in national democratic politics in the last three decades.

UDF co-president Archie Gumede phrased the problem clumsily when he raised it two months ago. But he was justified in asking whether there should not be a fundamental rethink in strategy.

There are historical precedents for political movements committed to fundamental change using, when appropriate, existing political institutions, if only for a platform and a legal shelter. There are some South African examples of this too, although they are not very happy ones. The history of the Labour Party demonstrates this well.

The arguments against such a move are strong. It is difficult to carry along a constituency mobilised in opposition to government-created representative bodies.

Then there is the possibility of elected leaders deserting their constituency, playing the system by its own rules. Any move of this kind would have to be debated, and leaders would have to be people of unswerving commitment.

In the end it may be found that the arguments against such a move are too strong. But the debate should take place, and not be cut off by expressions of moral outrage and accusations of treachery. These are difficult times, and the strategic issues which confront the progress of democratic opposition to apartheid are complex. The categories which are required to discuss them are analytical and dispassionate, not moral and emotive.

/12913

SACP Official Discusses Party's Policy on National Issues

34000125c Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS in English Oct/Nov 87 pp 11-16

[First paragraph WORK IN PROGRESS Introduction. Passages in boldface and italics as published]

[Text] In its alliance with the African National Congress, and as an independent organisation, the South African Communist Party has influence in the struggle over South Africa's future. The role and policy of the SACP will inevitably have a bearing on future political developments. In the interests of understanding the SACP's policy and position on a number of important issues, GLENN MOSS submitted questions to senior members of the party. The responses are those of a senior SACP official whose identity was not revealed to WIP.

How does the SACP characterise the relationship between classes in the current phase of struggle in South Africa, particularly those classes which are nationally oppressed?

The present phase of the revolution in our country is one of the whole oppressed people. This does not mean the oppressed 'people' can be regarded as a homogeneous entity. They are made up of diverse classes and strata whose long-term interests do not necessarily coincide, and whose consistency and commitment even to the immediate objectives of the democratic revolution cannot be equated.

But it remains true that the democratic revolution expresses the broad objective interests, not only of the working class, but of every class and strata within the nationally-dominated majority. This includes the black bourgeoisie. This reality provides the foundation for a struggle which attempts to mobilise all oppressed classes and strata as part of a national liberation alliance.

But what about the special role of the working class in this alliance?

The working class is an indispensable part of the liberation alliance. Its relations with other classes and strata in the alliance cannot, however, be on the condition that these other classes and strata accept socialist aims.

The historic programme which has evolved to express the common aspirations of all the classes which make up the dominated people is the Freedom Charter. But this document is not, in itself, a programme for socialism.

Does the immediate emphasis on the 'democratic revolution' (involving class alliances) imply that the working-class should abandon class struggle in favour of national struggle? And does it involve shelving socialist objectives in a struggle for bourgeois democracy?

The answer to these questions requires a correct grasp of the relationship between class and national struggle. Mechanical tendencies set out these categories as if they were almost mutually exclusive. This leads to inevitable confusion on the role of the working class and its mass and vanguard organisations. Failure to understand the class content of the national struggle and the national content of the class struggle in existing conditions retards both the democratic and socialist transformations which we seek.

The immediate primacy of the struggle against race tyranny flows from the concrete realities of our existing situation. The concept of national domination is not an ideological mystification to divert us from a class approach. It infects every level of class exploitation, and divides the working class into colour compartments.

National domination is underwritten by a state apparatus which in varying degrees protects the economic interests and social privileges of all classes among the white minority. It denies the nationhood of the African people and, in its place, imposes tribalism and ethnicity. These, and a host of related race practices, are the visible daily manifestations of national domination.

The chief victim of national domination is the black working class. Those who dismiss the fight against national domination as the key mobilising factor are living in an unreal world of their own.

The link between national domination and class exploitation undoubtedly needs exploitation undoubtedly needs unending stress. It is encouraging to observe the recent spread of an understanding of this link among organised sectors of the working class. But we must not exaggerate the extent and depth of this spread. Nor must we forget that insofar as it has spread, it is due primarily to the heightened experiences of struggle against race domination in the recent period.

What is meant by 'class struggle' in a period in which national liberation is the primary objective?

Class struggle in a period of capitalist hegemony is above all a political struggle aimed against the political dominance of the ruling class and at the ultimate winning of power by the working people.

But the shape of this class struggle does not remain fixed for all time. Its main emphasis and content at every given historical moment is dictated by the concrete situation. We cannot confine the meaning of working-class struggle to the immediate struggle for socialism. Nor can we conclude that participation by workers in inter-class alliances implies a postponement or compromise of their own class struggle.

The concept of 'class struggle' cannot be restricted to those rare moments when the immediate winning of socialist power is on the agenda.

Nor does it fade into the background when workers forge alliances with other class forces on commonly agreed minimum programmes. The history of all struggles is in fact overwhelmingly dominated by such interim phases. There is no such thing as 'pure' class struggle, and those who seek it can only do so from the isolated comfort of a library arm chair.

Workers in pre-1948 India were not abandoning the class struggle when they concentrated their main energies, in alliance with other class forces, to get Britain out of India. When Hitler unleashed world war, the main content of workers' class struggle correctly became the defeat of fascism. This task necessitated the most 'popular' of fronts, which brought together both pro- and anti-socialist forces.

It is a matter of historical record that the anti-fascist victory made possible the most significant spread of socialist power since the October revolution.

How does the SACP understand the relationship between national and class struggle, and between national liberation and socialism?

When we exhort the working class to devote its main energies, in alliance with other nationally-oppressed classes, to the immediate task of winning national liberation, we are certainly not diluting the class struggle or retreating from it. On the contrary, we are advancing and reinforcing it in the only manner which is consistent with the historic aspirations of the working class.

Nor are we putting off the socialist revolution by an emphasis on the national-democratic tasks of the immediate phase. In the words of Lenin, answering critics of Bolshevik policy on the earlier primacy of the democratic revolution, 'we are not putting (the socialist revolution) off but we are taking the first steps towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct path, namely the path of a democratic republic'.

The immediate emphasis on the struggle for democracy and 'people's power' is, in our present situation, an essential prerequisite for the longer-term advance towards a socialist transformation. But it is also a short-term class imperative. Race tyranny weighs more heavily on South Africa's doubly-exploited working class

than on any other class. Its destruction by the shortest route possible is, in itself, in the deepest class interests of our proletariat, who stand to gain more from the ending of national domination than any other class or strata among the oppressed.

This reality helps define the main form and content of the workers' class struggle at the present historical conjuncture, and the kind of alliances necessary to advance working-class struggle.

It is sometimes argued that the current emphasis on national liberation and struggle precludes the possibility of building socialism in a subsequent phase of struggle. It has also been suggested that one way of establishing the primacy of working-class interests in the future is to build and strengthen independent working-class structures in the current period. How does the SACP view these issues?

The need to concentrate on the present does not imply an abandonment or disregard of the future. Participation by the working class in the democratic revolution, involving alliances, minimum programmes, etc, does not imply a dilution of its independent class positions. On the contrary, the strengthening of workers' independent mass and vanguard structures is even more imperative in periods demanding organised relations with other class forces.

Nor does it follow that the spread of socialist awareness among the working people should be less during the phase emphasising democratic transformation. During this period it is even more vital to maintain and deepen working-class understanding of the interdependence between national liberation and social emancipation. This task cannot be postponed until after the ANC flag flies over Pretoria.

The participation of the working class and its political vanguard in the liberation alliance is, therefore, both a long-term and a short-term class necessity. The SACP's participation in this alliance is not, as our rightwing detractors would have it, an opportunistic ploy to camouflage our so-called 'hidden agenda', and to use the ANC as a stepping stone to socialism. We have never made a secret of our belief that the shortest route to socialism is via a democratic republic.

The SACP takes part in the liberation alliance, as one of its fundamental pillars, because we believe the elimination of national domination, which is the prime objective of the alliance, is the most immediate and vital concern of South Africa's proletariat.

The SACP has often been accused of creating a rigid distinction between national-democratic and socialist transformation. This 'two-stage' theory has sometimes been used to justify the suppression of socialist ideas and practices within organisations struggling for national liberation. What is the SACP's formulation of the 'two-stage' question?

What vulgar marxists do not understand is that there is both a distinction and a continuity between the national-democratic and socialist revolutions. Although the SACP correctly talks of 'stages', we do not believe there is a Chinese wall between such stages. But we can concede that our own formulations have sometimes been too imprecise, laying ourselves open to charges of treating stages as compartments, as 'things in themselves'.

The concept 'stage' implies a destination. Hence it is part of a whole. The question is how to reach a 'stage' without blocking the route towards the destination of which the 'stage' constitutes a dialectical and chronological segment. This depends, perhaps mainly, on revolutionary practice. On balance, the SACP's practice has not departed from the 'continuity' concept of stages.

The dominant ingredients of the later stage must already have begun to mature in the earlier stage. Discussing an analogous question which faced the Bolsheviks, Lenin wrote: 'We all categorise bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution, we all insist on the absolute necessity of strictly distinguishing between the two; however, can it be denied that, in the course of history, individual particular elements of the two revolutions become interwoven?'

Lenin's formulations have even greater relevance to our situation, in which, despite a few areas of similarity, we cannot really equate the national-democratic revolution to the classical bourgeois-democratic revolution. In contrast to 1905 and February 1917 in Russia, it is South Africa's bourgeoisie, and not a feudally-based autocracy, which wields power as the ruling class. Its accumulated economic riches have been built precisely by means of the very denial of bourgeois-democratic rights to the overwhelming majority. And, with the exception of the tiny and weak black bourgeoisie, our capitalist ruling class remains opposed to the universal extension of bourgeois democracy to the majority.

This reality is not negated by the radical-sounding rhetoric of some tycoons who are stimulated by a liberal conscience and, more importantly, by an understanding that certain aspects of race domination no longer suit their pockets.

In stressing the limitations of this group, we do not intend to belittle the very important task of helping by all means, including dialogue, to weaken cohesion and unity of the ruling class, and to isolate and weaken its most racist and politically reactionary sector. But the very fact that South Africa's ruling capitalist class is, and can be expected to remain, in the opposing camp, provides a special proletarian stamp to our national-democratic revolution.

It cannot be said of South Africa's immediate situation, as Lenin was able to say of pre-October Russia, that the 'revolution expresses the interests of the entire bourgeoisie as well'. This difference gives a special social content to the stage of our national democratic revolution.

When compared to analogous historical phases, certain of the key elements of our democratic revolution are, therefore, even more closely interwoven with the longer-term socialist transformation. Among the most important of these elements is the preponderant role of the working class in all phases of the revolutionary process and, more immediately, in the democratic alliance which makes up the liberation front.

What does it mean to talk of the 'dominant' or 'leadership' role of the working class in a phase in which the primary struggle is for national-democratic transformation?

The working class is everywhere the most consistent and unconditional fighter for democracy. But there are also special features of the south African situation which objectively reinforce its dominant role and enable the working class to put its imprint on all phases of the revolutionary process.

As already noted, the main constituent of the bourgeoisie by its very nature distances itself from the democratic revolution and has less prospect of influencing its course than in analogous situations. The black bourgeoisie is abysmally small and weak. The small peasantry which traditionally provides the main impetus for the petty bourgeoisie has been virtually decimated as a class. The black middle strata can find few, if any, alliances with its privileged counterparts across the colour line.

In general, the immediate aspirations of all classes and strata among the oppressed people can only be effectively advanced through the organised strength and leadership of the working class. But this leadership, which has an objective basis in the actual correlation of class forces in the present situation, has to be worked for on the ground. It will not come as a gift from heaven. And the working class cannot carry out its historic role merely by leading itself.

Our youth, women, intellectuals, small traders, peasants, the rural poor and even the racially-dominated black bourgeoisie are a necessary part of a broad front of struggle which must also seek to win over those whites who are prepared to shed racism. The working class must not only act independently to advance its interests as a class, but must also play a key role in this front as a champion of the democratic aspirations of all racially-oppressed groups.

The philosophy and practice of PAC's armed wing Poqo—'we alone'—means working-class surrender of its leading role in the democratic revolution. The result of such isolation would be to dilute the content of this revolution, to hand over its direction to other class forces and to endanger future socialist advance.

Organisationally, how can the working class both advance its own interests, and play a leading role in alliance with other classes?

In general, workers must be active wherever people come together in struggle, whether at national, regional or local levels. The UDF, youth organisations, women's organisations, civics, street committees, students, churchgoers, etc, must all feel the influence of workers' militancy and dedication.

But the role of workers as a class and the way this class relates to other classes rests on three main organised sectors of our struggle: the national movement, the trade union movement and, not least, the political party of the working class.

The national movement and the working class: As head of the liberation alliance and prime representative of all the oppressed, the ANC welcomes within its ranks all, from whatever class they come, who support and are ready to fight for the aims of the Freedom Charter.

The ANC is a revolutionary nationalist organisation whose popular roots, however, must not be confused with 'populism'. The ANC's strategy and tactics bear witness to an approach which recognises the significance of the different class formations which make up 'the people'.

To be truly representative of a people whose overwhelming majority are workers, the ANC recognises the need to show a strong bias towards the working class both in its composition and policies. It does not apologise for the fact that it considers it both proper and necessary for socialist ideology to be discussed and understood in its ranks.

But it would clearly weaken the necessary multi-class character of the ANC if it adopted socialist objectives as part of its programme. Although the ANC is not, and should not become, a workers' political vanguard, worker participation in its ranks is one of the most important ways in which the working class can assert its role in relation to other classes in the democratic revolution.

Trade unions and the working class: Trade unions are the prime mass legal organisations of the working class. To fulfil their purpose, they must be as broad as possible and must fight to maintain their legal public status. Unions must unite, on an industrial basis, all workers—at whatever level of political consciousness, the most backward and the most advanced—who understand the elementary need to come together to defend and advance their economic interests.

But a trade union cannot live without politics. The capitalist state everywhere acts in defence of the bosses. It uses all its instruments of power—the police, army, courts, etc—against workers and their trade unions. It does everything to defend the capitalist system. It makes and enforces laws to help increase workers' exploitation.

This reality has taught workers in every part of the world that it is impossible for their trade unions to ignore broader political conflict.

In South Africa, where racism and capitalism are two sides of the same coin, it is even clearer that a trade union cannot stand aside from the liberation struggle.

But the very fact that conditions demand that workers engaged in economic struggle must also involve themselves with broader political questions has helped to blur the line between trade unionism and political leadership of the working class as a whole.

The trade union movement is the most important mass contingent of the working class. Its organised involvement in struggle will help reinforce the dominant role of workers as a class. But the basic character of a trade union means it cannot act as a working-class political vanguard. If it attempted to do so, it would risk committing organisational suicide as a mass force.

What about the debate on whether to incorporate socialist objectives into the trade union movement, and the related question of union adoption of the Freedom Charter and/or a workers' charter?

We must guard against premature attempts to formally incorporate socialist objectives into programmes of trade unions and the federations to which they belong. Individual membership, or the affiliation of unions to a federation, cannot be made conditional on the acceptance of such a high level of political consciousness. To attempt to do so is to confuse a trade union with a political vanguard.

It is true that trade unions and workers' experience of struggle in unions provide the most fertile field in which to school masses of workers in socialist understanding and political consciousness. But this is not achieved by proclaiming 'aims' which are not yet understood by the mass of membership. Such an approach would narrow the mass character of the trade union movement and, in addition, give the enemy the very excuse it needs to deal with one of its most formidable foes.

The possibilities of spreading socialist consciousness within trade unions should not be sacrificed through short cuts which will, in fact, slow down its advances. The adoption by some unions of the Freedom Charter correctly reflects the mass popular mood. It is a pointer to a more realistic linkage between the economic and political struggle in the present phase.

The debate around the Freedom Charter versus a workers' charter is posed in an exclusivist way, and this leads to confusion. There is no reason why both the Freedom Charter and a workers' charter cannot stand side by side. In practice the debate, as posed by the 'workerist' tendency, has emphasised an incorrect 'either-or' approach.

What about the independent political organisation of the working class?

Victory in the democratic revolution must find a working class already equipped organisationally and ideologically to assert its role. A strong trade union movement and a workers' political vanguard are, we believe, essential preconditions for such an outcome. There is both a harmony and a distinction in the character and roles of these two vital sectors, and the failure to understand this distinction will inevitably weaken the cause of working-class leadership.

Workers' political leadership must represent the workers not just in economic struggle against the bosses, but in relation to all classes of society, and to the state as an organised force.

A trade union cannot carry out this role. Only a political vanguard of the working class, made up of professional revolutionaries coming mainly from the ranks of advanced working-class cadres with a capacity to combine both legal and illegal activity, can do so.

We believe the SACP is such a party, and that its history, with all its ups and downs, has equipped it to play such a role.

The SACP's characterisation of South Africa as a colonial situation of a special type is very controversial. Some have argued that the thesis of internal colonialism is only a descriptive metaphor, with no theoretical or explanatory status. Can internal colonialism as a concept really adequately interpret South African reality, with its developed class structures and cleavages based on a mode of production, distribution and circulation which is dominantly capitalist?

The term 'internal colonialism', or 'colonialism of a special type', is both analytically correct and politically useful in describing South African reality.

The reality it describes is that the colonial condition and status of the black majority has persisted despite the juridical, constitutional and economic changes which followed the Act of Union in 1910.

From the point of view of the dominated majority the form has changed, but the substance of their colonial status has not altered.

The onus is on those who contest this proposition to describe the point or the stage in the post-1910 period when blacks were freed from their special colonial constraints, which continued to apply to all of them whatever class they belonged to.

For example, can the proposition be disputed that the black worker is exploited both as a worker and as a black worker?

We deliberately do not equate internal colonialism with the classic colonialism which describes geographical separation between the colonial power and the colonised people.

That is why we call it colonialism of a special type. It is an innovative concept which should be judged in its unique context.

It is a concept which was not there in previous marxist learning, and we have entered it into the communist book in our elaboration of the indigenous theory of the South African revolution.

We believe the concept of internal colonialism provides a valid and rigorous theoretical foundation for the emphasis we give to the present phase of the national liberation struggle, particularly its main content in the period of the national-democratic revolution.

It provides a starting point for grappling with the complex question of the relationship between national and class struggle. It helps us to understand the specific character of South Africa's dominant capitalist mode of production and the way in which this specificity mediates and influences virtually every level of conflict within it.

The most persistent critique of our thesis relates to a charge that it nurtures a form of populism, allegedly conjuring up a struggle between 'peoples' rather than 'classes'. Of relevance here is what has already been said about the way we understand the relationship between class and national struggle and how we apply our understanding in revolutionary practice.

If there have been departures on this score, then they must be specifically assessed and debated, and not mechanically attributed to the basic internal colonialist thesis.

It is in any case difficult to understand why our detractors should conclude that the thesis leads to a dilution of our understanding of class divisions both within the dominant and subject peoples, and why it should divert us from the correct application of class criteria in the social conflicts.

This does not follow, even in the case of colonialism of the more classical variety such as Britain and pre-1948 India.

Cape Youth Congress Activist Reviews Strident, Youth Activity

34000125b Braamfontein WORK IN PROGRESS in English Oct/Nov 87 pp 33-35

[First paragraph WORK IN PROGRESS Introduction]

[Text] Student and youth organisation in the Western Cape remains weak, but has developed greatly in the last three years. A Cape Youth Congress activist reviews student and youth activity.

By the beginning of 1985 civic, youth and student activity in the Western Cape had declined. Organisations that had emerged during opposition to the 1984 tricameral elections were depleted. Some had collapsed, while others involved only a small number of activists.

Politics was reactive, responding to issues mainly through newspapers, pamphlets and mass meetings. No grassroots organisation had taken place, and mobilisation remained the dominant form of organising.

Students take the lead

The concern of ordinary students over the events in the rest of the country in early 1985, and their knowledge of the Transvaal and Eastern Cape schools boycott, sparked off the Western Cape schools boycott in July 1985. A slogan of the period, 'Eastern Cape today, Western Cape tomorrow' became a reality within months of it being painted on Cape Town walls.

These school boycotts played a major role in reviving and transforming organisation and politics in the Western Cape. During and after the boycotts student organisation grew rapidly, making gains in this area of struggle.

As a result of student struggles and organisation, youth organisations, especially the UDF-affiliated Cape Youth Congress, mushroomed and grew once more. Developing student struggles also gave rise to the 1985 consumer boycott, the rents boycott in Guguletu, Nyanga, Langa and KTC, and the formation of parent-teacher-student associations, education crisis committees, the Western Cape Teachers Union and the Democratic Teachers Union.

WECSO

The greatest achievement of students struggles during and after the school boycotts of 1985-86 involved the formation of WECSO—the Western Cape Students Congress. It is presently the only affiliate of the National Students Co-ordinating Committee able to function, and is strong and flourishing.

WECSO represents nearly 100 000 students, with ten area structures and about 80 students representative councils (SRCs). All schools from a particular area form

an area committee. WECSO is currently consolidating links with the West Coast Students Congress (Atlantis, Saldanha and Vredenberg) and the Boland Students Congress.

Formed towards the end of 1985, WECSO initially experienced many problems and had to be relaunched towards the end of 1986. By this time most SRCs in the region belonged to it.

Although weak at the time, WECSO successfully organised a boycott of the 1985 examinations. It effectively halted new departmental regulations introduced into African and coloured schools at the beginning of 1987: very few students re-registered, ID cards were burnt, and SRCs banned by the educational authorities were almost immediately 'unbanned' by students.

At present WECSO-organised schools are involved in support work for striking Spekenham workers, collecting food and money at school during people's education periods, and going door-to-door in the community.

WECSO emphasises four principles in its functioning: democracy, accountability, representation and non-racialism. This accounts for its significance compared to previous student organisation.

Over the past three years, WECSO has had to fight for the right of SRCs to take decisions independently from teacher, parent and other organisations. Before SRCs take decisions, other organisations are consulted and areas of conflict discussed. But at the end of this process WECSO maintains that students have the right to decide democratically on their chosen course of action. The New Unity Movement, SOYA, Cape Action League and others, have argued that SRCs should not have independence in decision-making. This, they suggest, is the function of the PTSAs.

WECSO has stuck firmly to its position, comparing its structures to those of the trade unions and their method of operating. When workers decide to strike over a factory-floor issue, neither the family nor community organisations have the right to vote on this. While others can be consulted, only workers involved in the dispute can finally decide on strike action.

For WECSO non-racialism is not a far-off dream but a reality that has to be worked for. Practical activity and campaigns are conducted so as to break down racial barriers. An example was WECSO's successful campaign to persuade the Western Province Senior Schools Sports Union to draw in African schools at all levels of sport.

Other organisations have started transforming methods of organisation and politics in response to student and other influences, such as street committees. The Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO) has been in the forefront of this process.

'Every student a youth member'

During the student struggles of 1985 and 1986 youth branches of CAYCO were not all active. Many did not take advantage of the militancy of students by attempting to draw them into youth organisation. Nor did CAYCO as a whole have a good working relationship with student structures. No joint campaigns or issues were taken up together.

The struggles of 1985 and 1986 produced a highly militant and politicised youth, many of whom began looking for an organisation to take forward their militancy. These young militants turned towards CAYCO.

Launched in 1983, CAYCO is one of the South African Youth Congress's oldest affiliates. It is a unitary structure consisting of about 38 youth branches in Cape Town, and has a working relationship with the Paarl Youth Congress, Youths of Worcester, and West Coast Youth Congress. It is one of the strongest Western Cape affiliates of the UDF.

Unlike many of the other youth organisations in the Cape, CAYCO has been able to sustain itself under the severe conditions of the state of emergency. Its president, Roseberry Sonto, has been in detention for nearly two years, and many other executive and active members have been jailed. Youth branches in KTC, Nyanga, New Crossroads and Bonteheuvel have come under attack from police, the SADF, kitskonstabels and vigilantes.

The major tasks that face all organisations in the democratic movement at present are:

- .how to build or rebuild street, yard, village and area committees;
- .where these structures do exist, how to advance and strengthen them;
- .how to build and strengthen defence committees to stave-off attacks from the state and vigilantes;
- .how to build and strengthen unity on national and local grassroots level;
- .how to begin seriously advancing working-class interests as the leading force in the democratic movement.

Through its campaigns on unemployment, a living wage, unban the ANC, and save the compatriots on death row, CAYCO is attempting to build strong grassroots youth structures, and assist in the building of UDF area committees, civics and COSATU locals.

Some CAYCO branches and regions have formally met student area committees and SRCs, and are embarking on joint campaigns. One such attempt too work together has been on the 'save the compatriots campaign', which concerns activists sentenced to death and currently awaiting execution.

Joint action between youth and student structures has seen a growth in CAYCO's membership, and also strengthened student structures. Youth work in helping to build SRCs, and assistance with awareness programmes and people's education continues, although unevenly.

CAYCO also works closely with SRCs from tertiary institutions like the Universities of the Western Cape and Cape Town, and with the South African National Students Congress. A CAYCO slogan spells out the aim: 'every student a youth member'.

Relations with COSATU

CAYCO's relationship with COSATU in the Western Cape is a new and shaky one. CAYCO accepts working-class leadership of the democratic struggle, and sees COSATU as the most strongly organised expression of the working class at present.

A close working relationship with COSATU is therefore an immediate priority for CAYCO. No formal relationship has been worked out as yet. But like the other organisations, CAYCO has been involved in joint activities with COSATU over the May Day stayaway, the two-day national action around the white election, the 16 June stayaway and similar events.

Through these activities, attempts have been made not only to meet executives of COSATU and other organisations, but also to work with the affiliates and grassroots organisations on a regional level.

Locally, CAYCO has been involved with COSATU affiliates and locals in the bus action committee fighting high fares introduced between Cape Town and the bantustans.

CAYCO has also assisted some of the COSATU locals, and has representation on these. This is a sensitive area for COSATU and exactly how CAYCO should relate to locals is presently under discussion.

Workers at the Spekenham factory in Bellville have been on strike for nearly two months. The Food and Allied Workers Union organised a support committee, consisting of community organisations and COSATU affiliates.

CAYCO's involvement in the Spekenham dispute is mainly concentrated on collection of food and money. Door-to-door collections of food and money has been undertaken across the peninsula. Youth branches are daily involved in presenting programmes for striking

workers. And youth branches where striking workers live have adopted workers, feeding and looking after them during the strike. Some of the striking workers have joined CAYCO while others have formed CAYCO branches.

Support for striking workers has not been taken up separately from other CAYCO campaigns.

It has been integrated into the living wage campaigns, just as rents and unemployment are seen as part of the fight for a living wage.

In CAYCO's view, attempts to not only mobilise but organise on grassroots level, building street and area committees, and locals, are the only way in which democracy and accountability can be practised. These structures and practices should be built and started now to ensure a future free of oppression and class exploitation.

CAYCO is presently looking at how youth in white areas can become affiliated to the organisation.

In line with CAYCO's non-racial policy it has been accepted that these youths should affiliate rather than form separate youth organisations.

Compared to three years ago, student and youth organisation in the Western Cape has developed greatly. But it remains weak: gains have to be consolidated, organisation strengthened and many more youths and students incorporated.

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SARHWU Official Discusses Union's Development Since Strike

34000126a Braamfontein *WORK IN PROGRESS* in English Oct/Nov 87 pp 56-58

[Interview with SARHWU General Secretary Sello Ntai; date and place not given. First Paragraph *WORK IN PROGRESS* Introduction. Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The South African Railways and Harbours Workers Union gained thousands of members after the three-month SATS strike earlier this year. GREG RUITERS interviewed Sello Ntai, SARHWU's general secretary, about the union's development since the strike.

How did you get involved in SARHWU?

I was born in 1955, in the Transkei. My father was a migrant worker employed by the railways in Durban.

While at school I began to question the role of the prefect system, comparing it with the induna system and conditions of employment on the railways. Although my

father desired that I should go to university, I realised that a role had to be played by someone with education in trying to change conditions on the railways.

I joined my father in 1980 as a labourer and found myself labelled as a 'kaffir' and a 'terrorist'. I was transferred to a remote place but at that point I left the railways and became active in the union movement and in organising railway workers.

Could you give us an insight into conditions of work in the South African Transport Services (SATS)?

Conditions are very bad. After five years' service a worker can apply for permanency. But most workers do not know this because they cannot read, and the information is provided in English or Afrikaans. So you find a worker with 30 years service who is still temporarily employed.

Racism is rife, with the foreman or supervisor being a 'baas' who has the power to fire workers. There is only a disciplinary procedure for workers to be punished but no grievance procedure. This breeds hatred.

And SATS employees are not covered by the Labour Relations Act and do not have access to the industrial court. There is no fairness in the procedures.

There are as many blacks as whites employed but in 1984, for example, only four blacks were apprenticed as opposed to 1 904 whites.

Parity moves by SATS do not address these problems.

The workplace environment is characterised by hatred between the white supervisors and the workers and this has turned the workplace into a political sphere.

The hatred leads to many unnecessary deaths. But even though conditions are so harsh there are many examples of black workers saving the lives of whites on the job.

The medical scheme is very poor. SATS doctors compel ill workers to return to work or lose their jobs. Only two weeks' paid sick leave a year are allowed.

Many workers do skilled work but are not paid for it. The rewards go to the supervisors. No white worker is supervised by a black person.

What about the situation in the hostels?

Conditions are inhuman. A percentage of earnings is deducted for food, although all workers get the same bad food. When a worker works overtime he finds that more money is deducted because of the percentage system, but the quality and quantity of the food remains the same. As a result of the poor food provided, workers are forced to buy food at shops owned by SATS in the compound.

No females are allowed in the hostels, so the men drink liquor a lot because of frustrations. And only meetings of management's chosen union, BLATU (Black Trade Union), are allowed on hostel premises.

Has SATS adhered to the agreement made between it and legal representatives of the union after the strike?

It may be that the top management was serious about the agreement. But the message from above is not automatically implemented by lower-level supervisors and foremen who are hardened racists. The foremen simply disregard the disciplinary procedures which SATS itself designed. There is no effective communication between top and lower level management.

In areas where the union is strong enough, workers can force local management to stick to agreements. And workers who went on strike have not lost pension, travel and medical benefits as a result of the strike. However, we believe that these benefits are not privileges but normal rights and should not be used by management.

How does SARHWU evaluate the three-months strike and SATS' eventual reinstatement of striking workers?

The strike was bad for both parties, and could have been avoided if SATS was prepared to be fair. It was not the union but years of pain and suffering which led to the strike.

Union membership grew rapidly after the strike—from 9 000 to 40 000—because of the desire of rail workers for an organisation which could properly represent them.

Whereas in 1982 SATS was able to simply fire 600 striking General Workers Union members in Port Elizabeth, this time conditions were very different.

SATS was being advised by the state's national security management system (NSMS), and was aware of the serious political consequences of its action. And SARHWU is a national union, with workers in centres like Pretoria and Cape Town prepared to take action in support of striking colleagues.

As a result of community anger about the way management handled the strike, SATS lost millions in damages to coaches. The union is strongly community-based and is affiliated to the UDF.

Most SATS workers come from the rural areas as migrants, and their wives and children were also organised by the strike. To sack 18 000 militant workers would have created severe political problems for the state in a number of areas. COSATU's Unemployed Workers Co-ordinating Committee played a vital role in reducing scabbing so that white schoolkids had to be employed by management as a last resort.

These jobs which they did are in many cases 'dirty' and very strenuous, but without them SATS cannot function. Skilled workers like the train drivers take six months to train. At what expense could they be fired?

In taking back the skilled workers SATS had to take everyone because of our unity.

SATS is aware that its labour practices are out of step with the rest of the country and its experts were advising changes to prevent strikes like ours. Other parastatals like SASOL and ISCOR negotiate with unions like SARHWU, so why not SATS?

But even if SATS had not faced reality and refused reinstatement, SARHWU would not have disappeared. We are here to stay.

SARHWU is affiliated to the UDF and some see this as an added barrier to the union being recognised by SATS. What is the union's view?

Workers are employees and also living in oppressed communities. Especially in SATS, on the mines and in agriculture, workers are exposed to terrible racism.

The UDF was not formed as a political organisation but as an anti-apartheid front. As a union organising in SATS we have a direct interest in opposing apartheid.

The most oppressed workers have an interest in full and direct leadership of the anti-apartheid front. Which other class can solve these problems?

If we are not in the UDF other classes with different interest will lead it. If we are fighting for a classless society, then the very people exploited must lead.

And finally, membership of the UDF does not mean that normal trade unionism cannot take place to the fullest.

How has the union coped with the recent flood of membership?

New structures and new sections such as the legal department have to be fully staffed. Hundreds of workers join every day and the membership is being computerised. We have branch offices in Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Germiston, Springs, Kroonstad, East London, Bloemfontein, Kimberley, Pretoria and the Vaal.

New technology and its effects on workers is being researched.

In Natal, Inkatha members have joined the union. We do not criticise Inkatha members, but we criticise Inkatha for misleading the workers.

Many people forget that if you want to have a field or a house in Natal, you must have an Inkatha card. You are forced to be a member.

What about the proposed merger with the Transport and General Workers Union?

The policy of one union, one industry is SARHWU policy. SARHWU is a pure industrial union whereas TGWU organises in private transport as well as cleaning and security workers.

We are looking forward to one national transport union. The alliance of bosses across the private and state transport requires a strong transport union.

There will have to be specialised departments to deal with the specific problems of state-sector transport. The militancy of the SATS workers is an inspiration to all, but we have very special problems as we are employed by the state. A federal structure of all state sector workers or a strong alliance between posts and telecommunications, local municipalities, railways, hospitals and education workers is required in order to win full trade union rights in the public sector.

The union recently warned the minister of transport that to continue ignoring SARHWU could provoke a dangerous situation. What has the response from SATS been?

We want to avoid a major confrontation and we really want to talk to management. We sent a memo to SATS outlining our position. All we got in reply was a letter acknowledging receipt of our memo and no commitment to speak to us.

We want the world to know that we are doing everything to avoid a confrontation. We will not allow ourselves to be provoked into strikes which could lead to the union being crushed. We are not threatening SATS with a strike.

Almost everyday we send out telexes to SATS and the police urging the release of our members. Some have been released but 40 are still being detained under section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

But SATS does not want to face the fact that the sweetheart BLATU is not accepted and is incapable of representing workers.

What about trying to change BLATU from within?

BLATU was started by management after the 1982 strike by 600 General Workers Union members in Port Elizabeth. Its constitution was not drawn up by the workers but by SATS. BLATU is no different from liaison committees chosen by management. And it is very difficult to change something formed by the system.

BLATU was formed through the induna system which is management's creation.

It is mainly Natal-based, and acts as a policing and disciplining agent for SATS. A BLATU official at Durban station who was being questioned by angry workers took out a gun, fired into the air and ran away.

How can an official in a meeting carry a gun?

BLATU is management in disguise. The whole point of BLATU is to divert workers from genuine unionism.

Most of our members are also BLATU members, I will not deny that. But it would not be easy for BLATU to organise SARHWU members.

When you join the railways you automatically become a member of BLATU. This is now being challenged as workers resign from BLATU.

What is the union doing to try to gain recognition from SATS?

We have organised almost all the workers in the Southern Transvaal and in other areas we are strong, although not in every department. We keep on informing management of day-to-day problems of the workers.

But the main thing we are pushing for now is a national ballot. We are also demanding all the rights offered by management to the staff associations like BLATU.

Workers are insisting that deductions from wages for union membership are now sent to SARHWU, not BLATU. If management agrees to this, it cannot refuse to recognise the union.

SATS is currently just treading water, while organisationally we have progressed beyond our expectations. Even some sympathetic white workers want to join the union. We are optimistic.

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West Cape Inhabitants Increase

34000144c Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
10 Nov 87 p 3

[Text] Capetown—The number of people living in the western Cape is expected to increase by about 350,000 from the present 2-million in the next three years, according to projections made by the Metropolitan Transport Planning Board of the Cape Town City Council.

The Board estimates that at present, the area has 606,090 whites, 568,170 blacks, 1,068,905 coloureds and 18,389 Asians.

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Government to Repossess Idle Land
34000133a Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL in English
3 Nov 87 p 1

[Passage in boldface as published]

[Text] **GOVERNMENT** will repossess land that is either under-utilised or used contrary to the covenants and conditions contained in the deed, Agriculture and Water Development Minister Fitzpatrick Chuula warned yesterday.

The minister who was addressing farmers at Lusaka's Nakatindi Hall expressed concern at the vast amount of arable land that was being under-utilised at a time when the country was facing food shortages.

"This sub-optimal use of land defeats our objectives in our efforts for food self-sufficiency and the creation of food reserves."

He urged commercial farmers to grow maize alongside their other agricultural activities. "I am saying this because Zambia's independence will be at stake if she is going to be fed by other countries when there is abundant land."

The ministry has the responsibility of ensuring that every piece of land was put to profitable and beneficial use and what the country requires now is increased maize production.

The government has invested K100 million into grain production and should, therefore, get results from this investment.

His ministry would soon inspect farms throughout the country to ensure that farmers started growing maize.

"This is the responsibility which the ministry never took seriously in the past but will do so now."

He gave an example of the Chisamba farming area between Lusaka and Kabwe which he said used to be a "maize belt" but had now been turned into a ranching area.

"What we want is maize on every farm and those who are not prepared to grow it must surrender their farms to other people who can do it."

Replying to queries about the poor producer price of maize which, at K80 per 90-kilogramme bag was considered unprofitable for the farmer, the minister said there was no choice but to grow maize.

"Just think of the thousands of Gwembe residents who are starving in the valley. It isn't their choice. They were displaced in order that we may have electricity," he said.

Zambian agriculture, he said, had become synonymous with producer prices.

"It is often said in farming circles that Zambian agriculture will not succeed because of the poor prices which farmers receive for their produce."

But he called on producers of all categories to place more emphasis and effort in reducing costs of production per unit of output as a means of increasing profitability.

"For too long now, there has been an over-emphasis on product pricing, to the neglect of cost considerations."

The Party and its government wanted new initiatives from the farming community, designed to effectively reduce production costs per unit of output.

"We should all be conscious of the fact that increased and more efficient production, especially of staple food crops such as maize, leads to the attainment of self-sufficiency and food security, which are in turn necessary conditions for obtaining and maintaining economic and political independence," he said.

Cde Chuula said inefficient production was what led to unwarranted price rises, a phenomenon that must be avoided at all costs.

On tenure and use of agricultural land, the minister reminded the farmers that this resource belonged to society as a whole and they were thus holding it temporarily.

"The state, as guarantor of this trust, has the duty and responsibility to ensure that land use patterns and cultivation structure are compatible with and contribute to the country's economic development objectives."

Sometimes the state had no alternative but to reallocate the tenure of agricultural land, which might at times come into conflict with the interests of the individual lease holder.

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UK Pledges More Aid
34000133b Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL in English
3 Nov 87 p 1

[Text] **THE BRITISH** government will not stop giving aid, currently running at approximately K200 million per year, to Zambia despite political arguments between the two countries, High Commissioner Mr Kelvin White said yesterday.

Mr White said that there were no plans to reduce its current aid programme and this would go ahead although there had been suggestions it should be cut, or threatened to be cut when political arguments arose.

Whatever the situation of the British economy, the aid would continue. He was speaking when he presented a word processor to the Ministry of General Education. Culture. Cde John Mwendela received the equipment.

"I have seen some suggestions that we cut, or threaten to cut, aid when we have political arguments. It was rubbish last year and rubbish this year."

Britain on one hand and 48 other members of the Commonwealth on the other severely differed over the imposition of sanctions against South Africa during a summit in Canada a fortnight ago. Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher was isolated over the issue.

Speaking yesterday, Mr White said that Britain was particularly happy when its support helped the education sector for it was only through education that Zambia could develop the necessary skills for its citizens.

There are currently 100 supplemented officers working in Zambia educational sectors and Britain is recruiting a further 36 mathematics and science teachers.

Receiving the donation, Cde Mwendela said the donation could not have come at a better time than now when the ministry was actively involved in the implementation of the educational reforms proposals and recommendations.

The exercise did not only aim at the improvement of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of education but also at correcting imbalances and deficiencies in the system.

Appropriate instructional materials were being developed including in-service training programmes for teachers, inspectors and other personnel. Educational requisites and facilities are also being improved.

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150 Per Cent Pay Raise for Millers

34000133c Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
5 Nov 87 p 7

[Text] WORKERS in milling companies under Mulungushi Investments have won pay rises of more than 150 per cent with a package of improved conditions of service.

The perks follow the signing of the first collective agreement between Mulungushi Investments and the National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW) in Kitwe last week.

NUCIW treasurer general Cde Francis Mwewa said workers who earn K90 a month would now be paid K200.

Housing allowance has been increased from K25 to K50 single, the workers would receive K25 transport allowance each month.

Long service awards have been hiked from K250 to K300 for those who have served for ten years, K400 for 20 years and K600 for 30 years.

Cde Mwewa, however, said the rates were yet to be ratified by the prices and incomes commission.

The milling companies taken over by the Government and operated under Mulungushi include Jamas in Kitwe, Chimanga Changa in Ndola, Roan Antelope in Luanshya and Olympic in Mufulira.

Once ratified payment would be backdated to October 1. Cde Mwewa said since the company was new the next collective agreement would be negotiated for after two years.

Meanwhile some workers from Strand Tailors in Kitwe which has been closed down are demanding to be paid for the period they have stayed at home.

The employees who have been redeployed to other council departments are demanding full salaries arguing that they are still in employment.

Governor Cde Peter Lishika said he did not know of any arrangement to pay workers for the period they were at home.

He said as far as he was concerned the factory was shut down and it was an act of sympathy by the council to redeploy the workers.

Cde Lishika said the question of paying the workers when they were out of employment has never been discussed.

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Mealie Output Drops

34000133d Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
5 Nov 87 p 7

[Text] KABOMPO district council is scouting for K100,000 to enable it to rehabilitate its milling plant whose production capacity has fallen drastically due to old machines, district executive secretary Benard Lihonde disclosed yesterday.

Cde Lihonde told Zana in a telephone interview that production at the plant has dropped to 150 bags per day instead of 200 bags of 50 kg because most parts of the machines have become worn out Zana.

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